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CONSTITUTIONAL VALUE JUDGMENTS AND  
INTERPRETIVE THEORY CHOICE 
IAN BARTRUM*
“How am I to obey a rule?” If this is not a question about causes, then 
it is about the justification for my following the rule the way I do. If I 
have exhausted the justifications I have reached bedrock, and my 
spade is turned. Then I am inclined to say: “This is simply what I do.” 
        -Ludwig Wittgenstein1
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I. INTRODUCTION
 Near the turn of the last century, a legal reporter asked the emi-
nent constitutional scholar Laurence Tribe to recommend the “best 
book on judicial review in the last twenty years.”2 His response was 
straightforward, though perhaps unexpected to those outside of con-
stitutional theory circles: “There are two, and they’re both by the 
same author.”3 That author was Philip Bobbitt, and the books were 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
 * Associate Professor of Law, William S. Boyd School of Law, UNLV. Thanks to 
Bruce Ackerman, Akhil Amar, William Araiza, Or Bassok, Peter Bayer, Philip Bobbitt, 
Richard Boldt, Rick Garnett, Mark Graber, David Gray, Michael Helfand, Deborah Hell-
man, Nicole Huberfeld, Mark Kende, Sylvia Lazos, Sanford Levinson, Chris Lund, Bill 
Marshall, Tom McAffee, Dennis Patterson, Christopher Peters, Ofer Raban, Miguel Schor, 
Lee Strang, Alex Tsesis, Howard Wasserman, Sean Wilson, participants in the Loyola Chi-
cago Constitutional Law Colloquium and the Southeastern Association of Law Schools 
Junior Scholars Symposium, and the members of the University of Maryland and UNLV 
Faculty Workshops for insightful commentary and conversations. 
 1. LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS § 217 (G.E.M. Anscombe 
trans., 3d ed. 1958). 
 2. Dennis Patterson, The New Leviathan, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1715, 1731 n.64 (2003). 
 3. Id. 
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Constitutional Fate and its somewhat belated sequel, Constitutional 
Interpretation.4 The central insight that distinguishes these books 
from the daunting mass of scholarly writing on the subject is Bob-
bitt’s unique account of what legitimates judicial oversight of legisla-
tive enactments, both generally and in particular interpretive appli-
cations. Taking his lead from the later work of Ludwig Wittgenstein, 
Bobbitt argued that constitutional law—indeed, the Constitution it-
self—is, like all language, a practice: “Law is something we do,” he 
wrote in the latter book, “not something we have as a consequence of 
something we do.”5 And, as with all language, what legitimates a giv-
en utterance or activity—what gives it “meaning” in the world—is 
how it functions within the rules of a particular communicative prac-
tice.6 Thus, the Constitution can have no meaning if not embedded in 
a shared practice of interpretation,7 and what legitimates a particu-
lar act of interpretation is the form or grammar of the argument it 
rests upon.8 With this insight in place, Bobbitt set about describing 
the accepted grammar of American constitutional argument. 
 The account Bobbitt arrived at describes six legitimate “modalities” 
of argument and interpretation: 
[1] The historical (relying on the intentions of the framers and rati-
fiers of the Constitution); [2] textual (looking to the meaning of the 
words of the Constitution alone, as they would be interpreted by 
the average contemporary “man on the street”); [3] structural (in-
ferring rules from the relationships that the Constitution man-
dates from the structure it sets up); [4] doctrinal (applying rules 
generated by precedent); ethical (deriving rules from those moral 
commitments of the American ethos that are reflected in the Con-
stitution); and [6] prudential (seeking to balance the costs and 
benefits of a particular rule).9?
To translate the abstract into the concrete, originalist approaches to 
constitutional interpretation, such as those advocated by Justices 
Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas, plainly fall into the historical
modality, while what some call “living” or “pragmatic” constitutionalism 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
4. Id.; PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE (1982) [hereinafter BOBBITT, FATE]; PHILIP 
BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (1991) [hereinafter BOBBITT, INTERPRETATION]. 
 5. BOBBITT, INTERPRETATION, supra note 4, at 24 (emphasis added). 
 6. WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 1, § 43.  
 7. We might analogize this claim to Wittgenstein’s assertion that language has 
meaning only inasmuch as it connects to a particular “form of life.” Id. §§ 19, 43. This claim 
underlies the famous remark, “If a lion could talk, we could not understand him.” Id. at 223.  
 8. In Wittgenstein’s later work, the concept of “grammar” filled the place that “logic” 
had occupied in his earlier writing. SEAN WILSON, THE FLEXIBLE CONSTITUTION (forthcom-
ing 2013) (manuscript at 9 n.1) (on file with author). 
 9. Id. at 12-13 (emphasis added). 
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fall more easily into the ethical or prudential modalities.10 In practice, 
the modalities often complement each other and act in concert within 
a constitutional argument.11 That is, in many fairly straightforward 
cases the most persuasive modal arguments all tend to point toward 
the same outcome. But Bobbitt conceded that difficult cases inevita-
bly arise where two or more modalities conflict in a kind of constitu-
tional impasse, and in these cases, we are likely to be most concerned 
about the unaccountability and potential idiosyncrasy of judicial re-
view.12 In other words, if in a particular case two equally legitimate 
constitutional arguments dictate opposite outcomes, what justifies a 
judge’s decision to choose one interpretive approach over the other? 
 Bobbitt recognized that his practice-based account was not thick 
enough—nor could it be, without deriving too much of an “ought” 
from an “is”—to offer much prescription in these kinds of cases.13
Nonetheless, he devoted much of Constitutional Interpretation to the 
issue, which he resolved by resort to a conception of judicial “con-
science” and ultimate acts of “moral decision.”14 Essentially, he ar-
gued that judges are the political actors we entrust—through various 
kinds of secondary rules—to choose between competing or contradic-
tory modal interpretive claims in difficult cases. And just as some 
poets pen better verse than others, in our argumentative practices, 
some judges are simply better decisionmakers than others. And in 
the end it is these argumentative practices, taken as a whole, that 
make constitutional meaning possible. This is all a part of the argu-
mentative practice that makes constitutional meaning possible. 15
While this resolution is ultimately correct in form, it has left many 
readers—including myself—feeling somewhat unsatisfied. It seems 
that we must be able to dig at least a little deeper into the justifica-
tions underlying these kinds of moral decisions before, to borrow 
Wittgenstein’s phrase, we hit bedrock and our spades are turned. 
And that is what I propose to do in this Article. By drawing an analo-
gy to Thomas Kuhn’s work on the value judgments that underlie  
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
 10. E.g., ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION (1997). On “living constitu-
tionalism,” see, for example, DAVID STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION (2010) and Bruce 
Ackerman, The Living Constitution, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1737 (2007). 
 11. See Ian C. Bartrum, Metaphors and Modalities: Meditations on Bobbitt’s Theory of 
the Constitution, 17 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 157 (2008) (describing the metaphorical overlap 
of modalities). 
 12. BOBBITT, INTERPRETATION, supra note 4, at 111-17. 
 13. I refer, of course, to Hume’s basic distinction between normative and descriptive 
claims. DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 302 (David Fate Norton & Mary J. 
Norton eds., 2000). Recall, however, more recent suggestions that we can draw a limited, 
functionalist kind of an “ought” from an “is.” See ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE 57 
(2d. ed. 1984) (“[F]rom the premise ‘He is a sea-captain’, the conclusion may be validly in-
ferred that ‘He ought to do whatever a sea-captain ought to do.’ ”). It is only this functionalist 
sort of normative claim that Bobbitt derives from his description of constitutional practice. 
 14. See BOBBITT, INTERPRETATION, supra note 4, at 156-62. 
 15. See id. at 178-86. 
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scientists’ choices between competing theoretical paradigms, I hope 
to offer a clearer picture of the practice of judicial review as it cur-
rently exists and also to offer some modest suggestions to make that 
practice more transparent and accountable. 
 I must begin by conceding, however, that while the broad analogy 
I draw to Kuhn’s work on scientific theory choice is reasonably apt, it 
does not seamlessly superimpose onto the evolving practice of consti-
tutional interpretation. The most conspicuous and relevant incongru-
ence between scientific practice and constitutional practice is that, at 
any particular point in time, no one legal interpretive paradigm is 
truly ascendant or dominant in the way that seems at least practical-
ly true in many fields of scientific endeavor.16 This is so because law, 
particularly legal interpretation, is much more clearly an indetermi-
nate practice than are the physical sciences, at least in the rational 
empiricist terms that we tend to conceive of those sciences.17 In other 
words, we are generally more willing to concede that the primary fo-
cus of constitutional interpretation—the “meaning” of disputed con-
stitutional language—is not empirically verifiable (or falsifiable) in 
the ways that we tend to associate with scientific inquiry.   
 Quite often we cannot verify textual “meaning” simply because 
many words refer us to imprecise linguistic rules—which are them-
selves subject to interpretation—rather than pointing to something 
objective in the world that we can all taste, touch, or see.18 To make 
matters even more complicated, we often use words in deliberately 
vague ways—and this is acutely the case with the constitutional lan-
guage that is most often the subject of dispute.19 This lack of empiri-
cal verifiability often means that constitutional meaning cannot be 
something “objective” in the sense of being directly accessible and 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
 16. By “legal interpretive paradigm” I mean a particular modality of constitutional 
interpretation. One could argue that a single legal interpretive paradigm dominates our 
practice if the definition given that paradigm were suitably broad and had room for various 
incommensurable kinds of practice. 
 17. This is not to say that science is not a social practice, complete with all the epis-
temic—and therefore interpretive—uncertainties that characterize legal interpretation. 
Indeed, that science is in many ways social is precisely Kuhn’s point and forms the basis of 
the analogy I ultimately want to draw. The salient difference here, however, is that a criti-
cal part of scientific practice seems to be a powerful normative agreement that practition-
ers should be able to agree on one true and correct theoretical paradigm—that there is, if 
we could discover it, one true way to explain relevant empirical observations. While a simi-
lar norm undoubtedly informs some types of legal interpretive practice, it is not nearly as 
powerful or widely accepted as is true within scientific practice. 
 18. For an account of language in these terms, see WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 1, at 1-60.  
 19. To be sure, in many cases constitutional language is suitably precise and determi-
nate—for example, the President shall have “attained to the Age of thirty five Years”—and, 
indeed, there is such widespread agreement on the appropriate linguistic rules—how we 
should understand the phrase “Age of thirty five Years,” for example—that very few inter-
pretive difficulties arise. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 4. For just this reason, however, such 
language very rarely gives rise to constitutional disputes, and very little theorizing is 
needed to resolve those disputes that do arise. 
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thus broadly agreed upon.20 Indeed, because our constitutional prac-
tice has adopted the sometimes-competing conventions Bobbitt de-
scribes, a practitioner may choose between several incommensurable 
though equally legitimate interpretive approaches.21 As a result, of 
course, competent practitioners may often arrive at quite different 
conclusions about the meaning of disputed constitutional language.  
 While this state of affairs would probably be untenable (at least 
for very long) in most fields of scientific inquiry, it is a generally ac-
cepted feature of constitutional argument and practice.22 It is there-
fore difficult to argue that interpretive theory choices in constitution-
al practice bring about true Kuhnian paradigm changes, which result 
in the near complete and fairly long-term reimagining of a field of 
scientific inquiry.23 Rather, constitutional interpretive theory choices 
are often made case-by-case or even issue-by-issue as lawyers and 
judges decide on which theory is most appropriate to resolve a par-
ticular problem at hand.24 It is true that many, if not most, jurists 
have general interpretive preferences—what we might loosely call a 
judicial philosophy—but even the most dedicated theoretical adher-
ents sometimes grow faint-hearted.25 With this in mind, I should 
make it clear that I do not claim the different interpretive modali-
ties are equivalent to different scientific paradigms. Nonetheless, 
an essential similarity between legal and scientific practices re-
mains, which is the focus of this Article: at some relevant point both 
endeavors require a choice between fundamentally incommensurable  
theoretical approaches.26
 In this regard, Kuhn’s claim that underlying value judgments de-
termine our theory choices offers a very important lesson for consti-
tutional argument.27 As applied to case specific decisions, Kuhn’s in-
sight reminds us that interpretive theory choices are, in fact, choices
and suggests that we should be transparent and explicit about the 
value judgments that underlie those decisions in a given context. In-
deed, this Article offers this twofold prescription: (1) constitutional 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
 20. In this context, one might reflect on Willard Quine’s influential attack on the em-
pirical dogmas at the heart of logical positivism. See W.V. Quine, Two Dogmas of Empiricism, 
60 PHIL. REV. 20 (1951). 
 21. See BOBBITT, INTERPRETATION, supra note 4, at 10-22 (summarizing the “modalities 
of constitutional argument”). 
 22. Id.
 23. THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 6-8 (1st ed. 1962) 
[hereinafter KUHN, STRUCTURE]. 
 24. See Bartrum, supra note 11 (describing the metaphoric overlap of interpretive 
approaches within even a single opinion). 
 25. See Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 864 (1989) 
(“I hasten to confess that in a crunch I may prove a faint-hearted originalist.”). 
 26. See discussion infra Part II. 
 27. THOMAS S. KUHN, Objectivity, Value Judgment, and Theory Choice, in THE ESSEN-
TIAL TENSION: SELECTED STUDIES IN SCIENTIFIC TRADITION AND CHANGE 320, 329-31 (1977)
[hereinafter KUHN, Objectivity].
264     FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW            [Vol. 40:259?
practitioners, particularly judges, should frankly acknowledge that 
nothing “objective” compels their resort to a particular interpretive 
theory in a particular case, and (2) they should be similarly forth-
right in explaining and justifying the constitutional value judgments 
their theory choices reflect.28
 In support of this prescription, Part II presents a brief description 
of Kuhn’s provocative and influential claims about scientific progress 
and the dynamics of scientific theory choice, and argues that there 
are some productive grounds for analogy between Kuhn’s account 
and our constitutional interpretive practices. Part III offers a prelim-
inary and nonexclusive catalogue of “constitutional values,” by which 
I mean the important or essential purposes we ascribe to the Consti-
tution within our democratic structure. These shared values can pro-
vide some objective grounds to assess particular theory choices, even 
if the ultimate act of decision remains essentially subjective. To iden-
tify these values I look primarily to the constitutional canon—those 
extra-constitutional texts that have settled most deeply into our in-
terpretive practice29—under the hypothesis that these texts are ca-
nonical precisely because they speak forcefully to widely held ideas 
about what the Constitution means or how it should function within  
our systems.30
 Part IV illustrates how these constitutional values relate to our 
existing interpretive theories or paradigms; that is, it attempts to 
give some account of the ways that particular value judgments may 
influence particular interpretive theory choices in actual cases. Here 
I suggest that Kuhn’s account can inform our ideas about the choice 
that must occur in a case where two or more incommensurable mo-
dalities come into direct conflict.31 Finally, I conclude that practition-
ers—especially judges—should explicitly acknowledge and justify the 
constitutional value judgments that ground their interpretive theory 
choices in particular cases. I make this claim on the consequentialist 
grounds that such a practice seems likely to produce clearer, more 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
 28. This prescription reflects Kuhn’s thoughts on how we are able to make normative 
assessments of particular theory choices. See Thomas S. Kuhn, Rationality and Theory 
Choice, 80 J. PHIL. 563, 563 (1983) [hereinafter Kuhn, Rationality] (“[T]he evaluation of 
criteria for theory choice requires the prior specification of the goals to be achieved by  
that choice.”). 
 29. There are many important explorations of the constitutional canon and its func-
tion in our practice. See, e.g., J.M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Canons of Constitution-
al Law, 111 HARV. L. REV. 963 (1998); Ian Bartrum, The Constitutional Canon As Argu-
mentative Metonymy, 18 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 327 (2009); Jamal Greene, The Antican-
on, 125 HARV. L. REV. 379 (2011); Richard A. Primus, Canon, Anti-Canon, and Judicial 
Dissent, 48 DUKE L.J. 243 (1998). 
 30. Within the roughly Wittgensteinian interpretive approach I have advocated else-
where, the Constitution’s “meaning” is, in fact, best understood as its proper use within our 
practice. E.g., Ian Bartrum, Constructing the Constitutional Canon: The Metonymic Evolu-
tion of Federalist 10, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 9, 10-12 (2010). 
 31. BOBBITT, INTERPRETATION, supra note 4, at 164-67.  
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focused debate and discussion about the underlying normative judg-
ments that ultimately give rise to constitutional meanings. This is 
not to say, of course, that such an approach would make our constitu-
tional disagreements any fewer or less profound, but, to borrow 
Charles Black’s words in defense of structuralism, “at least [we] 
would be differing on exactly the right thing[s], and that is no small 
gain in law.”32
II. THOMAS KUHN AND SCIENTIFIC THEORY CHOICE
 Thomas Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions is often 
ranked among the most influential books of the latter twentieth cen-
tury.33 In the unsettling wake of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s and Willard 
Quine’s respective attacks on ideal language theory and logical posi-
tivism,34 philosophers of science struggled to regain some reliable 
footing on which to ground the epistemological superiority of scien-
tific empiricism. 35  Karl Popper’s inspired resort to “falsifiability” 
seemed to save induction, at least, from the postmodern flames,36 but 
just a few years later Kuhn’s landmark intellectual history again 
brought us face to face with the underlying sociology of our 
knowledge.37 Rather than depict scientific progress in familiar linear 
and cumulative terms—with each new discovery adding a figurative 
brick to an ever-growing edifice—Kuhn’s book told a cyclical story of 
half built scientific houses abandoned on flawed foundations and of 
construction begun elsewhere on new, hopefully sounder bases.38 He 
called the typical brick-laying process “normal science” and the occa-
sional decision to start over elsewhere a “paradigm change.”39 Kuhn 
offered numerous examples, but perhaps the most illustrative is the 
dramatic Copernican shift to a heliocentric account of the solar sys-
tem.40 By the sixteenth century, astronomers had begun to find it in-
creasingly difficult to explain observational data within the Ptolema-
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
 32. CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., Some Particular Structural Considerations in Constitu-
tional Law, in STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 33, 48-49 (1969). 
 33. E.g., The Hundred Most Influential Books Since the War, THE TIMES LITERARY 
SUPP., Oct. 6, 1995, at 39. 
 34. See WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 1, at 1-3; Quine, supra note 20, at 20-25. These 
references are meant as illustrative examples of a larger 20th century attack on rational 
empiricism, which echoed, in more muted tones, Hume’s earlier and deeper skepticism. See 
DAVID HUME, AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING, § 4 (1748) reprinted in THE
EMPIRICISTS: LOCKE, BERKELEY, HUME 322-34 (1974) (outlining the problem of induction). 
 35. See, e.g., KARL R. POPPER, THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY 27-48 (5th ed. 
1968) (describing problems with verification theories of the scientific method). 
 36. Id. at 40-42, 78-92.  
 37. KUHN, STRUCTURE, supra note 23, at 166-69. For the reference, see KARL MANN-
HEIM, IDEOLOGY AND UTOPIA: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE (Louis 
Wirth & Edward Shils trans., 1955) (exploring individual experiences of meaning and truth). 
 38. KUHN, STRUCTURE, supra note 23, at 111-34.  
 39. Id. at 10-12, 68. 
 40. Id. at 68-69. 
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ic geocentric model, and then in 1543, Nicholas Copernicus presented 
a simple but devastating solution: move the Sun to the center of the 
system.41 Scientists gradually tore down the Ptolemaic building and 
began laying bricks at the Copernican site. By Kuhn’s lights, such mo-
ments of destruction and rebirth amount to “scientific revolutions.”42
 There was nothing startling about Kuhn’s book as a historical 
matter—in fact, it seemed to present an almost commonsensical ac-
count of the past—but his observations posed a formidable challenge 
to the traditional scientific narrative. Instead of a plodding evolu-
tionary process, wherein practitioners make incremental but ever 
progressive additions to human knowledge, Kuhn’s science actually 
seemed to move in the wrong direction for long periods of time. In-
deed, his theory seems to suggest that those “normal science” puzzle-
solvers at work today (or at any given time) are likely building upon 
flawed foundations that must eventually give way. Still, none of this 
was too intensely controversial, given that we might nevertheless see 
the work of everyday science as progressive on a meta-evolutionary 
scale; it is, after all, the frustrated puzzle-solvers—those who contin-
ue to bump their heads against the paradigm walls—that ultimately 
lead us toward a corrective revolution. But Kuhn’s ideas about the 
relationship between theoretical paradigms and about the processes 
by which we choose one paradigm over another were quite controver-
sial indeed. And it is among these ideas that I think lie the most 
fruitful grounds for an analogy between scientific practice and consti-
tutional interpretive practice. 
 Perhaps Kuhn’s most radical claim about the nature of competing 
theoretical paradigms is that they are incommensurable.43 Building 
on the work of Michael Polanyi,44 Kuhn argued that “when paradigms 
change, the world itself changes with them,”45 and thus proponents of 
competing paradigms simply lack the common referents or language 
with which to fully understand or evaluate one another’s point of 
view.46 This incommensurability results in part from the different 
ways that competing paradigms group concepts together to establish 
similarity relationships prior to naming those groupings or develop-
ing related terminology that refines them.47 In a later essay, Kuhn 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
 41. NICHOLAS COPERNICUS, ON THE REVOLUTIONS (1543), reprinted in 2 NICHOLAS
COPERNICUS, COMPLETE WORKS (Jerzy Dobrzycki ed., Edward Rosen trans., 1978). 
 42. KUHN, STRUCTURE, supra note 23, at 6-8. 
 43. Id. at 144-50. 
 44. See MICHAEL POLANYI, PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE: TOWARDS A POST-CRITICAL PHI-
LOSOPHY 151 (1958) (arguing that scientists in competing schools “think differently, speak 
a different language, live in a different world”).  
 45. KUHN, STRUCTURE, supra note 23, at 110. 
 46. Id. at 148-49. 
 47. Id. at 148. 
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illustrated such a problem in translation between Newtonian and 
other physical paradigms: 
The Newtonian terms ‘force’ and ‘mass’ provide the simplest sort of 
example. One cannot learn how to use either one without simulta-
neously learning how to use the other. Nor can this part of the lan-
guage-acquisition process go forward without resort to Newton’s 
Second Law of Motion. Only with its aid can one learn how to pick 
out Newtonian forces and masses, how to attach the corresponding 
terms to nature.48
Thus, the term mass as used within the Newtonian paradigm refers 
to a conceptual network that may not exist in other paradigms, and if 
the term does exist in those paradigms, it necessarily refers to a dif-
ferent set of concepts. As a consequence, language itself cannot pro-
vide neutral communicative grounds between paradigms.49
 For purposes of my analogy to Bobbitt’s work, it is also important 
to note that Kuhn’s view of the relationship between different scien-
tific paradigms roughly corresponds with Wittgenstein’s view of the 
relationship between different “language games.”50 Wittgenstein fa-
mously argued that very often a word’s “meaning” is its proper use in 
the contexts or “forms of life” in which it naturally arises.51 A form of 
life utilizes a corresponding language game, which may employ words 
used in other contexts, but—and this is critical—these words neces-
sarily take on new meanings consonant with their use in a new lan-
guage game.52 Thus, while a word may bear a “family resemblance” to 
itself across language games, no necessary and sufficient set of defi-
nitional conditions applies in all contexts.53 Wittgenstein illustrated 
this point using the word game itself as an example: 
[Here] I mean board-games, card-games, ball-games, Olympic 
games, and so on. What is common to them all? . . . To repeat: don’t 
think, but look!—Look for example at board-games, with their 
multifarious relationships. Now pass to card-games; here you find 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
 48. Kuhn, Rationality, supra note 28, at 566. Newton’s Second Law holds that accelera-
tion occurs when a force acts on a mass; the greater the mass, the greater the force required. 
 49. Id. at 566-67. 
 50. Kuhn explicitly acknowledges this similarity and discusses both Wittgenstein and 
language games in several pieces. See, e.g., KUHN, STRUCTURE, supra note 23, at 44-46; 
Kuhn, Rationality, supra note 28, at 570 (“[Hume’s critique of induction asks] for an expla-
nation of the whole language game that involves ‘induction’ and underpins the form of life  
we live.”). 
 51. WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 1, §§ 19, 43. As an aside, it is worth noting the “form of 
life” qualification here is critical to Wittgenstein’s larger philosophical claims. For a word 
to have meaning, it must function within an actual practice of life. It is when the philos-
opher extracts a word from its lived context and employs it in abstract theoretical  
pursuits that “language goes on holiday” and philosophical problems appear. Id. § 38  
(emphasis omitted). 
 52. See id. §§ 66-77 (discussing words’ relationships to themselves across language games). 
 53. Id. §§ 65, 67. 
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many correspondences with the first group, but many common fea-
tures drop out, and others appear. When we pass next to ball-
games, much that is common is retained, but much is lost.—Are 
they all ‘amusing’? Compare chess with noughts and crosses. Or is 
there always winning and losing, or competition between players? 
Think of patience.54
As with Kuhn’s competing theoretical paradigms, then, Wittgen-
stein’s language games are ultimately incommensurable in that no 
understanding of a word within one context can fully define its use 
(or meaning) within another, and no “neutral” language is available 
to make a completely literal translation possible. Indeed, Kuhn explic-
itly acknowledged his intellectual debt to Wittgenstein on this point in 
an extended discussion in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.55
 For Kuhn, the incommensurability of scientific paradigms was 
critically important because it had significant consequences regard-
ing the rationality of theory choices, or those processes by which sci-
entists eventually decide to give up on an old paradigm and adopt a 
new one. The most striking consequence of incommensurability is 
that it means we can never justify or explain the choice to adopt a 
new paradigm using the terms that exist within the old one.56 Be-
cause the conceptual groupings that constitute a new paradigm occur 
before scientists develop the linguistic apparatus to describe them, 
paradigm-neutral language with which to make arguments justifying 
a paradigm change is simply unavailable.57 The startling entailment 
of this position is, of course, that the decision to abandon an old par-
adigm and adopt a new one does not appear to be “rational,” in the 
sense of being objectively justifiable within the conceptual framework 
available to the decision-maker at the time she makes the decision.58
She must, in other words, choose to adopt the new paradigm before 
she will have the conceptual apparatus necessary to assess it.59 Given 
all of this, Kuhn—who never conceded that paradigm changes were 
actually irrational—thought it necessary to explain how we might 
nonetheless justify or explain the theory choices that are required to 
jump from one paradigm to another.60
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 54. Id. § 66. 
 55. See KUHN, STRUCTURE, supra note 23, at 44-46.  
 56. See id. at 149. 
 57. See Kuhn, Rationality, supra note 28, at 566-67 (describing problems of “local holism”). 
 58. See KUHN, STRUCTURE, supra note 23, at 151 (arguing that paradigm disputes 
“cannot be justified by proof[s]”). 
59. Id. at 149 (“Just because it is a transition between incommensurables, the transi-
tion between competing paradigms cannot be made a step at a time, forced by logic and 
neutral experience. Like the gestalt switch, it must occur all at once . . . or not at all.”). 
 60. See Kuhn, Rationality, supra note 28, at 563 (“[Hempel] is not one of those who 
suppose that I proclaim the irrationality of theory choice. But he sees why others have  
supposed so.”). 
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 He made his clearest efforts in this regard in delivering the Ma-
chette Lecture at Furman University in 1973, later published under 
the title Objectivity, Value Judgment, and Theory Choice. 61  Kuhn 
used the lecture as an opportunity both to clarify his own position 
and to rebuff critics who claimed he had reduced scientific theory 
choice to “a matter for mob psychology.”62 He adamantly denied accu-
sations that his account denied scientists any rational grounds for 
selecting “better” or “worse” theoretical paradigms and claimed to 
have said only that those grounds could not exist within one or an-
other of the competing paradigms.63 Rather, the criteria by which sci-
entists evaluate the merits of a particular paradigm must come at 
least partly from outside of science, and thus they are not entirely 
“scientific”—or what some might call “objective”—kinds of evalua-
tions.64 Instead, he likened these criteria of choice to what we would 
call “values” in other areas of human life, and he likened the choices 
themselves to what we might otherwise call “judgments.”65 Ultimate-
ly, a scientist must assess competing theoretical paradigms against 
the values he judges to be most important to a particular scientific 
endeavor and, unavoidably, “idiosyncratic factors dependent on indi-
vidual biography and personality” will inform those value judg-
ments.66 This is not to say, as Kuhn took pains to point out, that such 
judgments are inscrutable—scientists are often asked to justify their 
choices in this regard—but it is a refutation of the claim that some 
algorithmic proof formula might lead us ineluctably to a ‘true and 
correct’ theoretical paradigm: “[T]he criteria of choice . . . function not 
as rules, which determine choice, but as values, which influence it. 
Two men deeply committed to the same values may nevertheless, in 
particular situations, make different choices as, in fact, they do.”67
 Kuhn’s point is in all likelihood made clearer by examples, and he 
provided several. He began by positing a broadly shared, though not 
exclusive, list of five scientific values—the criteria by which scientists 
generally evaluate the merits of a scientific theory. His list is as fol-
lows: (1) accuracy relative to observations of nature; (2) consistency,
both internally and with other accepted theories; (3) broad scope, or 
consequences that reach “beyond the particular observations, laws,  
or subtheories [that the theory] was initially designed to explain”;  
(4) simplicity in ordering and explaining observed phenomena; and 
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 61. KUHN, Objectivity, supra note 27, at 320. 
 62. Id. at 321 (quoting Imre Lakatos, Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific 
Research Programmes, in CRITICISM AND THE GROWTH OF KNOWLEDGE 91, 178 (I. Lakatos 
& A. Musgrave eds., 1970)). 
 63. See KUHN, Objectivity, supra note 27, at 321. 
 64. See id. at 329. 
 65. See id. at 330-31. 
 66. Id. at 329. 
 67. Id. at 331 (emphasis added). 
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(5) fruitfulness in disclosing new phenomena or natural relationships 
for future study.68 Kuhn claimed that these values are so widely held 
among scientists that we might consider them the “standard criteria 
for evaluating the adequacy of a theory.”69 When utilized in actual 
scientific practice, “they provide the shared basis for theory choice,” a 
kind of “canon” that bestows communal and contextual legitimacy on 
a newly proposed paradigm.70 But, again, legitimacy is not proof; 
there is no precise formula for weighing these values against one an-
other, and individual practitioners may—and in fact do—judge some 
values to be more or less important in a given context.71 The range of 
legitimate value judgments is thus reasonably broad, and no “objec-
tive” measure can compel one theory choice over another. This ex-
plains why some practitioners may jump immediately to a new para-
digm, while others may hold out for many years.72
 Kuhn illustrated this process with references to several well-
known paradigm changes, but his discussion of the Copernican Revo-
lution is probably most helpful. He began by comparing the relative 
accuracy of the geocentric and heliocentric models of the solar system 
and concluded—perhaps surprisingly—that this important value was 
not determinative in 1543.73 In truth, the Copernican system “was 
not more accurate than Ptolemy’s until drastically revised by Kepler 
more than sixty years after Copernicus’s death.”74 Consequently, had 
Kepler not judged other scientific values to be more important than 
accuracy in this context, he might never have labored to make the 
improvements necessary to bring the heliocentric model into closer 
alignment with the observational data.75 Consistency also seemed to 
weigh against Copernicus. While both systems were internally con-
sistent, the heliocentric model flew in the face of “a tight-knit body of 
doctrine which explained, among other things, how stones fall, how 
water pumps function, and why the clouds move slowly across the 
skies.”76  Thus, Kepler could not have been overly concerned with  
the value of external consistency either. On simplicity, however, Co-
pernicus came out well ahead. The heliocentric model required only a 
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 68. Id. at 321-22. 
 69. Id. at 322, 325. 
 70. Id. at 322 (emphasis omitted).  
 71. See id. at 325 (“[T]he shared canons must be fleshed out in ways that differ from 
one individual to another.”). 
 72. Kuhn famously argued that it often takes at least a generation for a new para-
digm fully to take root, as those practitioners who have devoted their life’s work to puzzle-
solving within the old paradigm simply refuse to cast it aside. They must, therefore, die off 
and be supplanted by a new crop of scientists without such personal investments. KUHN,
STRUCTURE, supra note 23, at 151-52. 
 73. KUHN, Objectivity, supra note 27, at 323. 
 74. Id.
 75. Id.
 76. Id. at 323. 
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fraction of the complex mathematical apparatus that was necessary 
to explain phenomena such as planetary retrograde in Ptolemaic 
terms.77 Kuhn pointed out that this simplicity was “vitally important 
to the choices made by both Kepler and Galileo and thus essential to 
the ultimate triumph of Copernicanism.”78
 The Copernican example, then, helps illustrate the larger point 
that competing paradigms typically serve different criteria (or val-
ues) of theory choice in different ways and degrees.79 One theory may 
be more accurate than its competitors, but may lack the consistency
necessary to gain many practicing adherents; and more importantly, 
each practitioner must assess and weigh these questions individually 
before arriving at an independent judgment about a particular theo-
ry’s merits. 80  While individual practitioners may each develop a 
rough personal algorithm for making such judgments, no completely 
“objective” or universal algorithm is discoverable by rationalistic 
means.81 Ultimately, “every individual choice between competing the-
ories depends on a mixture of objective and subjective factors, or of 
shared and individual criteria.”82 As a result, one theory choice can-
not be compelled over another in a logically perspicuous way, and the 
unpersuaded scientist is never “wrong” to hold out against a chang-
ing paradigm.83 Rather, there are irreducibly idiosyncratic facets of 
every theory choice, which make an individual’s decision to change 
paradigms something like “a conversion experience that cannot be 
forced.”84 All we can say is that for some combination of shared and 
individual reasons, Kepler and Galileo found the Copernican model 
better satisfied their personal algorithms for scientific value judg-
ment—even when most other scientists did not—and their theory 
choices ultimately paved the way for many others.85
 Despite all of this, Kuhn never claimed that no grounds on which 
to evaluate the merits of a theory are shared, and he always main-
tained that some theory choices are demonstrably better than others.86
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
 77. Id. at 324. Kuhn makes the point, however, that this is only true if one views sim-
plicity in a particular way—with reference to planetary motion—which helps illustrate 
that a practitioner must sometimes pick out certain aspects of a particular value as more 
or less important. Id.
 78. Id.
 79. Id. (“[The Copernican] difficulties in applying standard criteria of choice are typical 
and . . . arise no less forcefully in twentieth-century situations . . . .”). 
 80. Id.
 81. Id. at 329 (“I continue to hold that the algorithms of individuals are all ultimately 
different by virtue of the subjective considerations with which each must complete the 
objective criteria before any computations can be done.”). 
 82. Id. at 325. 
 83. KUHN, STRUCTURE, supra note 23, at 151 (conceding that resistance to paradigm 
change is “inevitable and legitimate”). 
 84. Id. at 150. 
 85. Id. at 151-54. 
 86. KUHN, Objectivity, supra note 27, at 337-39. 
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Indeed, scientists are often called upon to justify the value judgments 
that have led them to adopt one theory over another, and very rarely 
do they say, “I just like this approach better.”87 Instead, a scientist 
usually outlines the particular scientific values she believes a theory 
serves and explains why she believes those values are important in a 
given context. Others can then disagree about the value judgment, 
and it is not inscrutable or, as Kuhn says, “undiscussable,” in the 
way that a simple matter of taste may be.88 But—and this point is 
critical—such a discussion is only possible where the practitioner is 
transparent regarding her value judgment, both in conceding that it 
is a value judgment and in justifying the factors that influenced her 
decision. Then the scientific community is able to clearly identify and 
delineate both the “objective” and “subjective” elements of a theory 
choice and engage in meaningful and sometimes persuasive evalua-
tions of competing paradigms. In such circumstances it is this trans-
parency, more than any “objectivity,” that qualifies a particular prac-
tice as “scientific.” 
 Constitutional practice is, of course, unlike most scientific practice 
in fundamental ways. Perhaps most obviously and importantly, un-
like in science, a number of interpretive paradigms can coexist rela-
tively peacefully in constitutional practice, and no one paradigm is 
likely to force the others out of business. As I argue above, this is a 
result of the essential indeterminacy of language and our communi-
cative practices.89 However, important grounds for analogy between 
these practices remain, particularly regarding the mutual necessity 
for choice between incommensurable theoretical alternatives. In con-
stitutional interpretation, the relevant moments of choice occur in 
close and difficult cases in which two or more interpretive modalities 
come into direct conflict and the decision to adopt a particular ap-
proach is outcome-determinative. In such cases, the judge or lawyer, 
like the scientist, must make a choice because no wholly objective 
criteria can compel a particular course of action. In these circum-
stances, I think Kuhn offers two important lessons for constitutional 
practitioners: (1) even science—that practice we hold out as the most 
objective of our endeavors—relies to some degree on individual value 
judgments, and constitutional interpretation inevitably (and legiti-
mately) should do the same; and (2) some shared or objective choice 
values remain, and thus there may be “better” and “worse” theory 
choices. With this in mind, constitutional practitioners—most partic-
ularly judges—should be as transparent as possible about the value 
judgments that lead them to adopt particular interpretive theories in 
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 87. Although, as Kuhn points out, “After 1926 Einstein said little more than that 
about his opposition to the quantum theory.” Id. at 337. 
 88. Id. at 336-37. 
 89. See supra Part I. 
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particular contexts. In the next two Parts, I hope to provide some re-
sources that might make this practice more systematic and accessible 
to constitutional interpreters. 
III.   THE CANON OF CONSTITUTIONAL VALUES
 The first task in devising a systematic “Kuhnian” approach to con-
stitutional interpretive theory choice is to establish a catalog of 
broadly shared constitutional values, by which I mean the purposes 
or functions we believe the Constitution rightly serves in our republic. 
This list will provide something like a “shared canon” of choice crite-
ria that practitioners can and should refer to when making and justi-
fying particular interpretive decisions.90 This task requires some un-
avoidably idiosyncratic choices of my own, and I want to be absolute-
ly clear that my account here is by no means exclusive. Other practi-
tioners quite likely could justify additions or refinements to my cata-
log, and in so doing they would only enrich this discussion and ap-
proach. Most important for my purposes is that the values I do iden-
tify are broadly held and that almost all constitutional practitioners 
would agree they are fundamental features of American constitution-
alism. After all, broad acceptance is what enables these values to 
function as shared or “objective” elements in our theory choices, while 
it is the weight and combination given to these values in a particular 
context that defines our individual or “subjective” value judgments.  
 With that said, I propose to justify my list of values by reference to 
what various scholars have called the “constitutional canon”—those 
texts apart from the Constitution itself which feature most centrally 
in our interpretive practice91—with the assumption that texts become 
canonical precisely because they embody points of broad interpre-
tive convergence.92 In what follows, I identify four constitutional 
values—constraint, flexibility, representation, and identity—on dis-
play in a number of widely cited and admired constitutional texts.  
A.   Constraint: Marbury v. Madison and Lochner v. New York
 Certainly one of the most critical functions the Constitution serves 
in our republic is as a constraint on government institutions and  
actors. As Bruce Ackerman has argued, it is the “higher law[]” in a 
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 90. For the reference, see KUHN, Objectivity, supra note 27, at 325 (characterizing 
criteria of choice as “shared canons”). 
 91. See, e.g., Balkin & Levinson, supra note 29, at 975-76 (explaining the concept of a  
constitutional canon).
 92. I have made the point elsewhere that texts become canonical for a number of rea-
sons, and the meanings associated with that canonicity are always evolving. Bartrum,
supra note 29, at 329-30. For the purposes of this analysis, however, I have tried to stick to 
the values I believe are most broadly associated with the relative texts. 
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system dedicated to the rule of law.93 Indeed, in this capacity, it is 
probably the most important limit in our conception of limited gov-
ernment. In operation, the Constitution restrains government in a 
number of ways, but in terms of constitutional interpretive practice I 
think it is most important to focus on the ways that it functions as a 
constraint within the institution of judicial review. With that in mind, 
the focus here is on two different forms of constitutional restraint, 
which establish something of an interpretive dialectic for constitu-
tional practitioners. First, the Constitution acts as a positive con-
straint on the branches of the federal government; it defines the lim-
ited powers allocated to each and then provides specific restrictions 
on their exercise. It is to enforce these positive restraints that the 
practice of judicial review necessarily arose.94 Second, however, the 
Constitution acts as a negative restraint on the institution of judicial 
review itself. The document at least implicitly demands that the 
Court not step in to deny the other branches those powers they right-
ly enjoy. These competing constraints are well articulated in two ca-
nonical texts: John Marshall’s opinion in Marbury v. Madison, and 
Oliver Wendell Holmes’ celebrated dissent in Lochner v. New York.95
Marbury, of course, arose out of a dispute over several signed, 
sealed, but undelivered judicial commissions left on the Secretary of 
State’s desk when John Adams’ administration reluctantly yielded to 
the incoming Jeffersonians.96 In Marshall’s opinion, the case boiled 
down to whether the Judiciary Act of 1789—which authorized the 
Supreme Court to issue “writs of mandamus . . . to any . . . persons 
holding office, under the authority of the United States”97—exceeded 
Congress’ constitutional authority.98 After reviewing Article III, Mar-
shall concluded that the Act impermissibly enlarged the Supreme 
Court’s original jurisdiction and was thus “repugnant to the constitu-
tion.”99 The remaining question, whether the Court could therefore 
declare the Act void, was in Marshall’s view “deeply interesting to the 
United States; but happily not of an intricacy proportioned to its in-
terest.”100 The Court had a fundamental duty to enforce the constitu-
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 93. 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 6-7 (1991). 
 94. See, e.g., Mary Sarah Bilder, The Corporate Origins of Judicial Review, 116 YALE
L.J. 502, 551-55 (2006) (demonstrating that virtually all Americans, including critics of 
judicial review, assumed the institution would be necessary during the ratifying debates). 
 95. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 74 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting); Marbury v. 
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). For an excellent discussion of the dialectical rela-
tionship between these cases, see Miguel Schor, The Strange Cases of Marbury and Loch-
ner in the Constitutional Imagination, 87 TEX. L. REV. 1463 (2009). 
 96. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 155. The outgoing Secretary who failed to deliver 
the commissions was, of course, Marshall himself. 
 97. An Act to Establish the Judicial Courts of the United States, ch.20, § 13(b)-(d),
1 Stat. 73, 81 (1789). 
 98. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 173.  
 99. Id. at 176. 
 100. Id.
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tional limits on legislative power, and thus the doctrine of judicial 
review was established.101 This announcement itself would be enough 
to canonize Marbury, but for purposes of understanding the underly-
ing constitutional value at work, it is worth considering some of Mar-
shall’s subsequent language. 
 The most illustrative passage finds Marshall responding to an im-
agined interlocutor’s suggestion that the Court lacks authority to 
strike the Act down: 
This doctrine would subvert the very foundation of all written con-
stitutions. It would declare that an act, which, according to the 
principles and theory of our government, is entirely void; is yet, in 
practice, completely obligatory. It would declare, that if the legisla-
ture shall do what is expressly forbidden, such act, notwithstand-
ing the express prohibition, is in reality effectual. . . . That it thus 
reduces to nothing what we have deemed the greatest improve-
ment on political institutions—a written constitution—would of it-
self be sufficient, in America, where written constitutions have been 
viewed with so much reverence, for rejecting the construction.102
Marshall makes it clear that the very purpose of writing out the con-
stitution was to establish express textual limits on federal power and 
jurisdiction, and without judicial enforcement those limits would be 
meaningless. Indeed, his argument here is the fountainhead of an 
ongoing debate over the interpretive implications of the Constitu-
tion’s “writtenness.”103 What is significant for my purposes is not so 
much the nature of this debate but that it continues to take place. 
This is powerful evidence that Marshall’s opinion still embodies a 
broadly felt constitutional value: the positive constraint of a trans-
cendent rule of law. 
 Judicial review itself presents a significant threat to the rule of 
law, however, in the specter of an overreaching bench of unelected, 
life-tenured jurists; and thus the Constitution must also act to check 
the Supreme Court’s substantive power. This second type of con-
straint forms the complement—or antithesis—of the interpretive dia-
lectic discussed above: the Court must prevent the political branches 
from overstepping their constitutional authority, but it must likewise 
permit those branches to exercise the powers that are rightly theirs. 
To fulfill this latter function, the Constitution must provide a nega-
tive kind of constraint on judicial action—the Court must not impose 
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 101. Id. at 176-80. It is perhaps interesting to note that, had Congress not mooted an 
earlier controversy by repealing an offending law, James Wilson’s opinion in Hayburn’s 
Case would likely have established federal judicial review. THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 368 (Kermit Hall, ed., 2d ed. 1992); see also Hay-
burn’s Case, 2 U.S. 408 (1792). 
 102. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 178. 
 103. See, e.g., Andrew B. Coan, The Irrelevance of Writtenness in Constitutional Inter-
pretation, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1025, 1026-28 (2010) (canvassing the debate). 
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limitations that are not established by the constitutional text. This 
facet of constitutional constraint is on display in Justice Holmes’s 
canonical dissent in Lochner. There the Court confronted a New York 
law—the Bakeshop Act—which limited the number of hours per 
week a laborer could work in a bakery.104 The constitutional question 
presented was whether the maximum hours provision impermissibly 
burdened a “right of contract” implicitly protected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause.105 Although the Court had recent-
ly upheld a similar law governing miners,106 Justice Rufus Peckham 
argued that, unlike mining, bakery work presented none of the dan-
gerous conditions that might justify state intervention in contractual 
relations.107 Declaiming any intention to “substitut[e] the judgment of 
the court for that of the legislature,” Peckham nonetheless concluded 
that the New York law was unconstitutional.108
 Justice Holmes opened his short, powerful dissent by cutting di-
rectly to the core of the constitutional value involved: 
This case is decided upon an economic theory which a large part of 
the country does not entertain. If it were a question whether I 
agreed with that theory, I should desire to study it further and 
long before making up my mind. But I do not conceive that to be 
my duty, because I strongly believe that my agreement or disa-
greement has nothing to do with the right of a majority to embody 
their opinions in law.109
The Constitution, Holmes suggested, leaves economic (and other) pol-
icy choices up to elected representatives and majority will, and une-
lected judges who read their own preferences into the constitutional 
text effectively subvert the rule of law to individual disposition. In-
deed, he argued that the Constitution is a kind of neutral framework 
“made for people of fundamentally differing views,” and it is only pol-
icy-neutral kinds of constraints that the Court may enforce against 
the Legislature.110 And, as the academic literature evinces, Holmes’ 
expression of the counterpoint—the negative limit—of judicial review 
has settled into the constitutional canon just as firmly as Peckham’s 
majority opinion has sunk to the depths of the anti-canon.111
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 As illustrated in Marshall’s canonical opinion in Marbury and 
Holmes’s canonical dissent in Lochner, one of the most important 
functions the Constitution serves in our democratic processes is as a 
constraint on government institutions and actors. This constitutional 
value—what I have labeled constraint—has at least two distinct as-
pects: the Constitution should act as both a positive check on the 
lawmaking power and a negative check on the exercise of judicial re-
view. Moreover, I suggest that this value is precisely the kind of cri-
terion of choice constitutional practitioners should and do bear in 
mind as they evaluate the relative merits of adopting a particular 
interpretive theory in the context of a given constitutional problem. 
Of course, both the questions of how to apply the value of constraint 
and of how much weight to give this value relative to other criteria 
remain open to individual judgment. And among the other important 
values a practitioner must consider is the interest of flexibility.
B.   Flexibility: McCulloch v. Maryland
 Americans proudly lay claim to the one of the oldest written con-
stitutions in the world.112 France, our rough contemporary in consti-
tutional time, is on at least its fifth draft since 1791—and the careful 
observer might count several more.113 To survive in the face of rapidly 
changing cultural and technological development, a constitution 
must be flexible—it must bend so that it does not break.114 And this 
kind of flexibility is among the qualities we value most in our Consti-
tution; its critical joints have enough play that we are able to avoid 
catastrophic political crises and incorporate even dramatically 
changed circumstances into the constitutional apparatus. It is, in 
part, this very flexibility—and the value we place upon it—that 
makes constitutional interpretation necessary and controversial. It 
complicates, and is in many ways in tension with, the value of con-
straint as described above. The more flexible the Constitution is, in 
other words, the less rigid and effective are the constraints it applies. 
Nonetheless, flexibility is indeed an important constitutional value in 
our interpretive practices, as is evident in perhaps the most canonical 
case in the constitutional catalog: McCulloch v. Maryland.115
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 In McCulloch, the Court confronted fundamental questions about 
the relative scope of state and federal power under the Constitution. 
The case arose out of a controversy over the creation of a national 
bank, which had begun almost as soon as the Constitution was rati-
fied. At Alexander Hamilton’s urging, the First Congress established 
such a bank in 1791, with the proviso that its charter would expire in 
twenty years.116 As it turned out, James Madison—who opposed the 
original bank—was President in 1811, and he successfully cam-
paigned against renewing the charter.117 But after the War of 1812 
left the new nation in serious financial trouble, Madison changed his 
mind and got behind the movement for a Second National Bank.118
Unhappy with this development, the state of Maryland decided to 
impose an annual tax of $15,000 on the bank’s Baltimore branch.119
When cashier James McCulloch refused to pay, Maryland took him to 
court arguing that Congress had no constitutional authority to create 
the bank.120 Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion addressed two distinct 
questions: (1) whether Congress had the power to create the bank; 
and (2) if so, whether Maryland could tax it.121 His discussion of the 
first question is what makes the constitutional value of flexibility
most apparent. 
 Marshall began by conceding that the federal government is “one 
of enumerated powers,” and nowhere among those explicit powers 
could he “find that of establishing a bank or creating a corpora-
tion.”122 But he went on to conclude that nothing in the Constitu-
tion—unlike its predecessor the Articles of Confederation—“excludes 
incidental or implied powers.”123 Indeed, he argued, the Constitution’s 
drafters “had experienced the embarrassments” of so limiting federal 
power and sought “to avoid those embarrassments” the second time 
around.124 He then wrote a passage that is among the most canonical 
in our constitutional law, precisely because it enunciates the funda-
mental value of constitutional flexibility: 
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Argument: A Primer, in LINDA H. EDWARDS, READINGS IN PERSUASION: BRIEFS THAT 
CHANGED THE WORLD 203 (2012).  
 116. GEORGE BROWN TINDALL & DAVID E. SHI, AMERICA: A NARRATIVE HISTORY 330-32 
(4th ed., 1996). 
 117. Id. at 393. 
 118. Id.
 119. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 319. 
 120. Id. at 317-19. 
 121. Id. at 401, 425. 
 122. Id. at 405, 406.  
 123. Id. at 406. Article II of the earlier document reserved to the states “every power, 
jurisdiction, and right” not “expressly delegated to the United States, in Congress assem-
bled.” ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. II.  Marshall distinguished this language 
from the Tenth Amendment, in that the latter omits the word “expressly.” McCulloch, 17 U.S. 
(4 Wheat.) at 406. 
 124. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 406, 407.
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A constitution, to contain an accurate detail of all the subdivisions 
of which its great powers will admit, and of all the means by which 
they may be carried into execution, would partake of the prolixity 
of a legal code, and could scarcely be embraced by the human mind. 
It would probably never be understood by the public. Its nature, 
therefore, requires, that only its great outlines should be marked, 
its important objects designated, and the minor ingredients which 
compose those objects be deduced from the nature of the objects 
themselves. . . . In considering this question, then, we must never 
forget, that it is a constitution we are expounding.125?
The final line here is rightly the most famous and often repeated. 
Marshall’s point is that it is in the very nature of a constitution to be 
flexible; that this flexibility is, in fact, critical to how constitutions 
actually function within a political system. With this in mind, Mar-
shall had no trouble concluding that Congress enjoyed the authority 
to charter a national bank.126
McCulloch, then, stands as a testament to the importance we as-
cribe to constitutional flexibility in our democratic processes. We val-
ue a constitutional architecture that is broad, sturdy, and in many 
ways generic in that it allows us to adapt the underlying structures 
to many new (and novel) political purposes.127 This desire for flexibil-
ity necessarily exists in some tension with the value of constitutional 
constraint—the more flexible a constitution is, the less it con-
strains—and in this regard the different weight that Chief Justice 
Marshall assigned to these values in different constitutional contexts 
is informative. That constitutional values may sometimes compete 
with one another only adds complexity (and idiosyncrasy) to our in-
terpretive theory choices. 
C.   Representation: Democracy and Distrust and  
Brown v. Board of Education
 Our Constitution establishes a republican form of government, 
and to that end one of the principal functions it serves is as a guaran-
tor of our right to be represented in critical decisionmaking processes. 
The ostensible purpose of a constitution, after all, is to provide a 
method or form of government, and in the United States, that meth-
od undoubtedly centers on popular participation. Recall that it was 
not just British taxation the colonists condemned on the eve of revo-
lution; it was taxation without representation.128 Thus, it can be no 
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 125. Id. at 407. 
 126. Id. at 425. 
 127. For an excellent account of state constitutionalism in precisely these architectural 
terms, see Jeffrey L. Amestoy, Foreward: State Constitutional Law Lecture: Pragmatic 
Constitutionalism—Reflections on State Constitutional Theory and Same-Sex Marriage 
Claims, 35 RUTGERS L.J. 1249 (2004). 
 128. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 89 (1980). 
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surprise that the bulk of the original constitutional text is dedicated 
to matters of process, jurisdiction, and representation.129 Indeed, Ar-
ticle IV goes so far as to “guarantee to every State in this Union a 
Republican Form of Government,”130 and even some of the most im-
portant rights enshrined in the first ten amendments speak directly 
to participation and representation—most of the First Amendment, 
for example—reflect this value.131 And it is not just political majori-
ties whose voice the Constitution protects; minorities must also have 
their place in the discussion.132 The central importance of this value 
is on clear display in two canonical texts from the latter half of the 
20th century: John Hart Ely’s seminal book Democracy and Distrust,
and the Supreme Court’s opinion in Brown v. Board of Education.133
 John Hart Ely was teaching at Harvard Law School in 1980 when 
he published perhaps the most influential and widely cited book on 
constitutional law of the last half century. 134 He dedicated Democracy 
and Distrust to Chief Justice Earl Warren, for whom he clerked dur-
ing the 1964-65 term, and the book is in some ways an effort to de-
fend the Court’s work under Warren’s leadership.135 Building on Jus-
tice Harlan Stone’s famous fourth footnote in United States v. Caro-
lene Products Co.,136 Ely pushed back against both strict construction-
ist and “value imposition” interpretive theories and advocated what 
he called a “representation-reinforcing” approach to judicial review.137
Under this approach, judicial oversight and intervention is most ap-
propriate when the representative mechanism itself breaks down: 
Malfunction occurs when the process is undeserving of trust, when 
(1) the ins are choking off the channels of political change to ensure 
that they will stay in and the outs will stay out, or (2) though no 
one is actually denied a voice or a vote, representatives beholden to 
an effective majority are systematically disadvantaging some mi-
nority out of simple hostility or a prejudiced refusal to recognize 
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 129. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 1-7; art. II § 1, cls. 1-4; art. IV, §§ 3, 4; art. V; art. VII. 
 130. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4. 
 131. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (protecting rights of speech, press, petition, and assembly). 
 132. Among the chief functions the Federalists believed the new government would 
serve would be to protect minority rights in the states against coalesced majority factions. 
See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 64-65 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke, ed. 1961); THE
FEDERALIST NO. 85, at 588 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke, ed. 1961). 
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STUD. 397, 401 (2000) (ranking Ely’s book first by a wide margin). 
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 136. 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).  
 137. ELY, supra note 128, at 85-88. Ely argued that strict-constructionist theories could 
not adequately address the Constitution’s open-ended clauses, while value oriented—or 
“interpretivist”—approaches placed too much power in judicial hands. See id. at 11-72. 
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commonalities of interest, and thereby denying that minority the 
protection afforded other groups by a representative system.138
Ely’s first point clearly applies to political efforts to manipulate or 
interfere with voting or political speech, but his second point is di-
rected, more subtly, at violations of the Equal Protection Clause.  
 Harnessing the old political theory concept of “virtual representa-
tion”—a phrase anathema to the founding generation for its misuse 
by British apologists—Ely argued that representation breaks down 
when legislators enact laws of which they themselves do not feel the 
burden.139 True representation occurs only by “tying the interests of 
those without political power to the interests of those with it,” and 
laws that disadvantage underrepresented minorities decisively break 
those ties.140 In this way, Ely was able to conceive of what many 
might see as a substantive kind of value—“equal protection”—as 
serving value-neutral process and representative purposes. But for 
my purposes, it is not so important where Ely saw manifestations of 
the representation value appear in the text, but rather that he recog-
nized this as a fundamental constitutional value—and that many 
others have agreed with that assessment.141 Indeed, the same judg-
ment underlies one of the most canonical decisions of the last century, 
Brown v. Board of Education.142
 I hope I need not do much to justify Brown’s canonical pedigree. 
Perhaps it is sufficient to note that Bruce Ackerman has suggested 
that today “no Supreme Court nominee could be confirmed if he re-
fused to embrace Brown.”143 The case, of course, consolidated several 
equal protection challenges to racially segregated public schooling 
and asked the Court to overturn the constitutional doctrine that al-
lowed for “separate but equal” treatment of the races.144 In reinter-
preting the Fourteenth Amendment, Chief Justice Warren’s opinion 
characterized the importance of public education in terms of the un-
derlying constitutional value of equal participation and representation: 
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state 
and local governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and 
the great expenditures for education both demonstrate our recog-
nition of the importance of education to our democratic society. It 
is required in the performance of our most basic public responsibil-
ities, even service in the armed forces. It is the very foundation of 
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 139. Id. at 82-83. 
 140. Id. at 83.  
 141. Ely would, of course, disclaim the “value” language as attached to representation 
or “participation,” but he does concede that others might cast it in those terms. Id. at 75 n.*. 
 142. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).  
 143. Ackerman, supra note 10, at 1752. 
 144. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). The quoted language appears in Justice 
John Harlan’s celebrated dissent. Id. at 552 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
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good citizenship . . . . Such an opportunity, where the state has 
undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made available 
to all on equal terms.145
The constitutional importance of public education, then, is that it fa-
cilitates meaningful participation in American civic and political life. 
Further, the underlying constitutional value of representation de-
mands that such participation is available to all on at least roughly 
equal terms. Whether in Ely’s “virtual” conception or in Warren’s 
own words, Brown is in significant ways a case about the importance 
of equal representation in American democracy. And the Warren 
Court would go on to champion this constitutional value in several 
other important decisions, including, notably, Reynolds v. Sims.146
 Among the Constitution’s most important purposes is to establish 
the structures and processes of a representative democracy. Two of the 
Twentieth Century’s most canonical constitutional texts—Democracy 
and Distrust and Brown v. Board of Education—illustrate the central-
ity of this value in American constitutionalism. Again, the value may 
complement or compete with the values of constraint and flexibility 
as described above, and some may value it more than others, but  
I suggest that every competent constitutional practitioner must  
consider representation as she makes interpretive theory choices in 
particular cases.  
D.   Identity: The Declaration of Independence and the                    
Gettysburg Address 
 In addition to the values discussed above, the Constitution serves 
an important expressive function as a source and symbol of our na-
tional identity. To be American is, as much as anything, to endorse a 
national ideology made manifest in a particular form of political or-
ganization constituted by our founding document. In this regard, the 
Constitution not only provides us with the kind of national memory 
and continuity that John Locke famously theorized as at the heart of 
personal identity over time,147 it also gives us a kind of aspirational 
identity as we confront new problems in an ever-changing world. 
Even as we remain flexible to cultural and technological evolution, 
the Constitution helps remind us of the core principles that make us 
Americans. It is in this sense that we sometimes characterize some-
thing unconstitutional as also something “un-American.” The value of 
national identity is particularly apparent in the constitutional canon-
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 146. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). 
 147. JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING, Bk. II, Ch. XXVII,
§§ 10-20 (Peter H. Nidditch ed., 1975) (1689). 
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ization of two political texts: Thomas Jefferson’s Declaration of Inde-
pendence and Abraham Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address.148
 In two of the most important and controversial decisions handed 
down in the last century—Gray v. Sanders and Reynolds v. Sims—the 
Supreme Court made conspicuous reference to Jefferson and Lin-
coln.149 In holding that the Fourteenth Amendment requires states to 
roughly equalize their citizens’ representative voting power, the 
Court concluded that “[t]he conception of political equality from the 
Declaration of Independence, to Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address, to the 
Fifteenth, Seventeenth, and Nineteenth Amendments can mean only 
one thing—one person, one vote.”150 In truth, of course, neither of 
these texts has any legal authority, but the Court understood their 
deep relevance to the constitutional question at hand: they are pro-
found statements of American national identity and should therefore 
inform our understanding of constitutional first principles. Indeed, 
both texts—the Declaration rather more than the Address—appear 
in numerous Court opinions, and most constitutional scholars would 
place them firmly within the constitutional canon.151 These two texts 
speak both to our historical identity as a nation and to the identity 
we aspire to assume in the years ahead, and that they have become 
canonical parts of our constitutional practice demonstrates the value 
we place on the Constitution as a source of those identities. 
 The Declaration of Independence is, of course, more than its soar-
ing preamble, but it is in the preamble that we find the most compel-
ling statement of our collective political identity: 
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created 
equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unal-
ienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit 
of Happiness.—That to secure these rights, Governments are insti-
tuted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of 
the governed,—That whenever any Form of Government becomes 
destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to 
abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its foundation 
on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to 
them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness.152
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Jefferson made three distinct claims here about the American credo. 
The first is an aspirational kind of claim about basic human equality 
and the existence of certain natural rights; the second is a theoretical 
claim about the just grounds of governance; and the third is a politi-
cal claim about the legitimacy of revolutionary reform. The first 
claim was, of course, not one the original Constitution recognized in 
operation, but it did state a profound national aspiration—an identi-
ty we might assume, in Lincoln’s words, “as fast as circumstances 
should permit.”153 The latter two claims reflect our national ideas 
about the organization and spirit of democratic government in ways 
that continue to inform our public discourse. 
 Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address repeated these same themes, with 
one important difference: it made the realization or failure of the 
Declaration’s first claim—our aspirational human equality—the 
stakes of the Civil War:154
Four score and seven years ago our fathers brought forth upon this 
continent a new Nation, conceived in Liberty, and dedicated to the 
proposition that all men are created equal. . . . Now we are en-
gaged in a great civil war, testing whether that Nation or any Na-
tion so conceived and so dedicated can long endure.155
It was, after all, eighty-seven years after the signing of the Declara-
tion—not constitutional ratification—that Lincoln spoke in Gettys-
burg; and it was this Jeffersonian “Nation so conceived” that was on 
trial by fire.156 For Lincoln, the Declaration captured the real Ameri-
can identity, which the Constitution must be made to embody. And in 
perhaps the most often repeated phrase of the address, Lincoln reit-
erated Jefferson’s latter claims and made his own rhetorical contribu-
tion to our identity narrative: we are dedicated to a “[g]overnment[] of 
the people, by the people, and for the people.”157 The constitutional 
significance of the Gettysburg Address, then, is that it recommits us 
to Jefferson’s ideals and hopes to restore our lost national soul to its  
better nature.158
 What is most important for purposes of this discussion is that these 
two formative texts—neither with any binding legal authority—resound 
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2013]                  CONSTITUTIONAL VALUE JUDGMENTS 285?
so powerfully in our constitutional imaginations. They appear and 
reappear in our constitutional arguments precisely because they ap-
peal to our deepest feelings of national identity, and we believe that 
the Constitution should function to advance that identity in law. The 
value of identity, then, asks us to consider how well a particular in-
terpretive theory choice works to express our national sense of self or 
how successfully it produces results that align with our ideas about 
the kind of people and nation we are or want to be. In our choice cal-
culus, it is a source of shared conviction, but it also ultimately refines 
our considerations of constraint, flexibility, and representation in 
imprecise and individualized ways. 
 In Part II, I suggested Thomas Kuhn’s account of the role that 
shared scientific values play in scientific theory choice might contain 
some valuable lessons for our constitutional interpretive practices. In 
Part III I hope I have identified within the constitutional canon a 
nonexclusive list of broadly accepted “constitutional values,” or the 
functions we generally believe the Constitution should play in our 
republic. In Part IV below, I give a descriptive account of how these 
shared values might have influenced the choices that several U.S. 
Supreme Court justices made in two illustrative cases.  
IV.   INTERPRETIVE THEORY CHOICE
 With at least a working catalogue of constitutional values now in 
place, we can begin to assess the various ways that underlying judg-
ments about these values may inform our choices between Bobbitt’s 
interpretive modalities in outcome determinative cases. To begin, 
however, it is important to recall that Bobbitt’s account is fundamen-
tally Wittgensteinian in that he sees the meaning of constitutional 
language as intelligible only in practice, as we look to the ways that 
we use particular terms within the forms of argument that actually 
exist in our constitutional forms of life.159 Moreover, this conception 
also means that the various modalities are, like Wittgensteinian lan-
guage-games, essentially incommensurable.160 That is, the meaning 
of constitutional language as it is used within one modal framework 
is not fully translatable into another modality—just as Newtonian 
mass may not exist within a different physical paradigm.  
 This means that, as is true of Kuhnian theory choices, we cannot 
justify our decision to adopt a particular interpretive modality in a 
particular case within the terms of the modality we have rejected. 
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And just as with scientific choices, no apparent transcendent kind of 
rule can compel—rather than influence—our choice between these 
incommensurable modalities. Bobbitt forthrightly conceded that 
this leaves us in a position very similar to that of the scientist con-
fronted with a potential paradigm change—with our spades turned 
on justificatory bedrock:  
If there is no conclusive mode, no trans-modal standard, how do we 
know when the judge is right? How do we justify the result of a 
constitutional decision in a particular case? It would appear that 
the incommensurate nature of the various modalities of argument 
that enable legitimation makes such an assessment impossible. 
For if these modes lead to different outcomes, we have no rule that 
enables us to choose among them.161
As discussed above, Bobbitt left this kind of decision to the largely 
inexplicable judicial “conscience”; indeed, he argued that it is the 
very incommensurability of the modalities that opens the necessary 
space for the kind “moral decisions” that legitimate judicial review.162
After all, if a “meta-rule” or “trans-modal standard” did exist, there 
would in theory be no place for judicial decisionmaking—only 
straightforward rule-obedience—and we have no reason to think that 
judges do this any better than others.163
 Nothing in what I argue is inconsistent with Bobbitt’s resolution, 
with which I basically agree. My claim is simply that we can under-
stand these acts of judicial conscience as analogous to Kuhnian value 
judgments, which rely on both objective choice criteria and subjective 
decisionmaking. Conceived this way, it becomes possible to assess the 
merits of a particular choice against both the shared canon of consti-
tutional values and the normative value justifications an individual 
practitioner necessarily supplies. While such an approach will never 
reveal “true” or “correct” theory choices, it seems likely to facilitate 
more clear-eyed discussion of the underlying normative divergences 
that motivate our value judgments, and to permit more “objective” 
assessments of those judgments against the backdrop of our shared 
constitutional value structure. 
 Part IV.A examines, through examples, the ways underlying con-
stitutional value judgments might lead a practitioner toward a par-
ticular theory choice in a particular context. Part IV.B argues that 
these often opaque judgments should be made explicit in constitu-
tional argument, with practitioners indicating the constitutional val-
ues on which they rely and then justifying the weight or gloss given 
to each value in making their judgment. I begin with a description of 
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the potential correlations between constitutional values and interpre-
tive theories using two fairly recent decisions as illustrations. 
A.   Argumentative Modalities and Constitutional Values 
 It is perhaps not too difficult to imagine, at least in a rough sort of 
way, the likely correlations between particular constitutional values 
and particular argumentative modalities in many contexts. We might 
suppose, for example, that historical argument most often serves the 
values of negative constraint and identity and is less likely to facili-
tate flexibility. Structural argument, on the other hand, might usually 
well promote the values of representation and flexibility but less often 
serve identity. And perhaps ethos arguments generally highlight 
identity, though sometimes at the cost of constraint. In truth, an ar-
gumentative modality may sometimes serve all four of the constitu-
tional values to varying degrees. But if it were true that we could all 
agree on a one-to-one sort of correlation between particular constitu-
tional values and particular argumentative modalities across a broad 
spectrum of decisional contexts, then interpretive theory choices 
would be a great deal more “objective” than they actually are. Indeed, 
it is exactly the impossibility of this sort of “universal algorithm” that 
led Kuhn to his account of value judgments in the first place.164 Ra-
ther, the actual weight and combination of values that underlie any 
theory choice are imprecise, context-specific, and most importantly, 
subject to individual judgment. 
 With this in mind, I do not attempt to provide any formulaic kind 
of value/theory correlation here, nor do I make any normative judg-
ments about the “rightness” or “truth” of a particular theory choice. 
All I can offer are descriptions of our actual practices—indeed, I sug-
gest this is the proper aim of constitutional scholarship—in the hope 
that these examples can shed some illustrative light on our processes 
of constitutional argument and judging.165 It is ultimately true, of 
course, that I make a normative claim about the desirability of value 
transparency in judicial opinions, but nowhere do I offer any particu-
lar criteria for evaluating those value judgments once they are re-
vealed. That assessment is left to the practice itself, which allows 
particular judgments to settle more or less resolutely into the consti-
tutional landscape. What I can do, however, is present some exam-
ples of outcome-determinative interpretive theory choices made in 
actual constitutional decisions and offer some assessment of the val-
ue judgments those choices seem to reflect. The two examples I have 
chosen are of fairly recent vintage, and they involve an interpretive 
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problem—the scope of federal legislative authority—that continues to 
generate heated constitutional debate. 
1.   Gonzales v. Raich
 In 1996, California voters passed Proposition 215 legalizing the 
cultivation and use of marijuana for the treatment of “seriously ill” 
patients.166 The state law, codified as the Compassionate Use Act of 
1996,167 squarely conflicts with the federal Controlled Substances Act 
(CSA), which classifies marijuana as a Schedule I drug without an 
accepted medical use.168 This conflict eventually came to a head in 
August 2002, when federal agents raided a medicinal user’s home 
and, after a three-hour standoff with state authorities, confiscated 
and destroyed six marijuana plants.169 The resulting Supreme Court 
case turned on whether Congress has constitutional authority to reg-
ulate the wholly intrastate cultivation and personal use of marijuana 
and thus raised time-honored questions about the scope of federal 
power under the Commerce Clause.170
 Between 1937 and 1995, an extraordinarily deferential Court up-
held every exercise of federal commerce power that came before it, 
but at the close of the last century two decisions—United States v. 
Lopez and United States v. Morrison—seemed to put some outer lim-
its on congressional authority.171 Before Lopez and Morrison, the doc-
trine dating back to Wickard v. Filburn permitted Congress to regu-
late even wholly intrastate activity (in that case, wheat cultivation 
for personal use) so long as it had the aggregate potential to exert “a 
substantial economic effect on interstate commerce.”172 Since 1995, 
however, the Court has made it clear that the regulated activity must 
itself be economic in nature so that the Commerce Clause does  
not “obliterate the distinction between what is national and what is 
local . . . .”173 The defendants in Raich hoped that with Lopez and
Morrison as guidance, the Court might be prepared to further revisit 
the extraordinary deference it had afforded Congress in Wickard.
 It was not to be, as the Court voted 6-3 to uphold the federal act as 
applied to California medicinal users. 174  Writing for the majority, 
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Justice John Paul Stevens chose to proceed primarily within the doc-
trinal modality, and he argued that the case called for a fairly 
straightforward application of the Wickard rule.175 Although Lopez 
and Morrison had put some checks on federal commerce power, the 
personal cultivation and use of marijuana was much too close to the 
personal wheat farming in Wickard to justify a constitutional distinc-
tion.176 In particular, Stevens pointed out that the Wickard Court had 
reasoned that a rise in market prices might easily draw “personal” 
wheat into the interstate market, and he argued that the “high de-
mand” for marijuana presented at least as great a danger.177 In either 
case, he argued, “the regulation is squarely within Congress’ com-
merce power because production of the commodity meant for home 
consumption, be it wheat or marijuana, has a substantial effect on 
supply and demand in the national market for that commodity.”178
Stevens thus saw Raich as a straightforward doctrinal decision, and 
no evidence suggests that he paused long to consider any competing 
interpretive theoretical approaches. Justice Sandra Day O’Connor wrote 
the principal dissent in the case, arguing—again doctrinally—that 
Lopez and Morrison had carved out sufficient room for individual 
states to “experiment” with different kinds of drug policies.179 What is 
of more interest to this discussion of interpretive theory choice, how-
ever, are the concurring and dissenting opinions authored by Justices 
Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas, respectively. 
 Justice Scalia wrote separately to make clear that his understand-
ing of the relevant doctrine was “more nuanced” than Stevens’ opin-
ion might suggest.180 The primary nuance, it turned out, was a large-
ly prudential interpretive approach that located congressional au-
thority to regulate intrastate marijuana use in a combined reading of 
the Commerce and the Necessary and Proper Clauses.181 That Scalia 
would choose here to utilize the doctrinal and prudential interpretive 
modalities is at least somewhat anomalous given his oft-repeated 
preference for historical and textual arguments,182 but for the same 
reasons, his opinion provides an informative case study regarding the 
kinds of value judgments that might underlie particular interpretive  
theory choices.  
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 Scalia began with the concession that “activities that substantially 
affect interstate commerce are not themselves part of interstate 
commerce, and thus the power to regulate them cannot come from 
the Commerce Clause alone.”183 Instead, he argued that “substantial 
effects” analysis must be rooted in the Necessary and Proper Clause, 
which empowers Congress to regulate not only commerce itself but 
also to “facilitate interstate commerce by eliminating potential ob-
structions, [or] to restrict it by eliminating potential stimulants.”184
Despite his efforts to locate this principle precisely in the existing 
doctrine, it is evident that this particular “nuance” is primarily a 
product of his own prudential reading of the case law.185 And, in the 
interest of constitutional prudence, he took matters one interpretive 
step further. Though he acknowledged that Lopez had placed some 
limits on the necessary and proper power, he emphasized that the 
doctrine continued to allow Congress to regulate even noneconomic
activity so long as it was “an essential part of a larger regulation of 
economic activity, in which the regulatory scheme could be undercut 
unless the intrastate activity were regulated.”186
 Having thus restated and refined the doctrine, Scalia proceeded to 
make a prudential case for the wisdom of his suggested constitutional 
policy, at least as it seemed likely to play out in the case at hand. He 
pointed out that “[d]rugs like marijuana are fungible commodities” 
and argued that “Congress need not accept on faith that state law 
will be effective in maintaining a strict division between a lawful 
market for ‘medical’ marijuana and the more general marijuana 
market.”187 Thus, as a practical matter, the realities of the interstate 
drug trade convinced Scalia that California’s medicinal marijuana 
law would “undercut” the federal government’s larger regulatory 
scheme. 188  This likelihood distinguished the case from Lopez, in 
which no “intelligible” federal scheme appeared threatened.189 There-
fore, on the prudential grounds that the state law would likely prove 
ineffective, he concluded that Congress must enjoy constitutional au-
thority under the Necessary and Proper Clause to regulate intrastate 
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marijuana grown for personal use. In Raich, then, Scalia made a 
clear choice to abandon his avowed historical and textual interpre-
tive predilections in favor of a fairly straightforward doctrinal and  
prudential approach. 
 Not so for Justice Thomas, however, who stuck firmly to constitu-
tional “text, structure, and history” in concluding that “neither the 
Commerce Clause nor the Necessary and Proper Clause grants Con-
gress the power to regulate respondents’ conduct.”190 Repeating ar-
guments he made in Lopez and Morrison, Thomas claimed that in 
1789, commerce was understood to encompass only “selling, buying, 
and bartering, [or] transporting for those purposes”:  
Throughout founding-era dictionaries, Madison’s notes from the 
Constitutional Convention, The Federalist Papers, and the ratifi-
cation debates, the term “commerce” is consistently used to mean 
trade or exchange—not all economic or gainful activity that has 
some attenuated connection to trade or exchange. The term “com-
merce” commonly meant trade or exchange (and shipping for these 
purposes) not simply to those involved in the drafting and ratifica-
tion processes, but also to the general public.191
This, of course, is a paradigmatic historical argument, complete with 
references to many of the canonical sources. Given the historical evi-
dence, Thomas had no difficulty concluding that personal, intrastate 
marijuana cultivation and use did not fall within the original public 
meaning of “commerce.”192
 Thomas conceded that the Necessary and Proper Clause presented 
a “more difficult” question, but for largely textual and structural rea-
sons, he concluded that it also failed to afford Congress the relevant 
constitutional authority. 193  The clearest textual reason for the 
clause’s inadequacy is its express limitation to laws that “carry[] into 
Execution the foregoing Powers.”194 If personal medicinal marijuana 
use is not “commerce”—much less “interstate commerce”—it is very 
difficult to see how federal regulation is an appropriate means to a 
constitutionally permissible end.195 For structural reasons, Thomas 
flatly rejected Scalia’s prudential claims about the likely inefficacy of 
the state law in keeping medicinal marijuana out of the marketplace: 
“We normally presume that States enforce their own laws . . . and 
there is no reason to depart from the presumption here: Nothing  
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suggests that California’s controls are ineffective.”196 Moreover, even 
if the state law did “allow some seepage” into the interstate market, 
federal regulation was not a “proper” exercise of the commerce pow-
er.197 As a structural matter, Thomas argued that “the Government’s 
rationale—that it may regulate the production or possession of  
any commodity for which there is an interstate market—threatens 
to remove the remaining vestiges of States’ traditional police pow-
ers.”198 Unlike Scalia, Thomas chose to employ historical, textual, 
and structural interpretive modalities, and that choice was likely  
outcome-determinative in Raich.
 The relevant question here is why Scalia would choose to write a 
straightforward doctrinal and prudential opinion in this case, when 
his typical historical and textual approach—as Thomas’s dissent 
demonstrates—would likely have produced a different outcome. As 
Scalia himself offers very few clues about the value judgments that 
informed his theory choice, we can do no more than speculate as to 
his motivations. With that in mind, I suggest that it is reasonable to 
suppose Scalia judged the constitutional value of flexibility to be of 
paramount importance in this particular case. In addition to his re-
peated worries about the real world consequences of too rigid or for-
malistic a reading of the Commerce Clause, Scalia cited to McCulloch 
v. Maryland—again, the canonical instantiation of flexibility as a 
constitutional value—no less than six times in his brief opinion.199
Indeed, he twice quoted Marshall’s opinion at length, and on the se-
cond occasion the value of constitutional flexibility shone through: 
To impose on [Congress] the necessity of resorting to means which 
it cannot control, which another government may furnish or with-
hold, would render its course precarious, the result of its measures 
uncertain, and create a dependence on other governments, which 
might disappoint its most important designs, and is incompatible 
with the language of the constitution.200
For Scalia, Marshall’s language supported his judgment that the 
Constitution must not straitjacket Congress’ pursuit of deeply im-
portant national policy goals—in this case the War on Drugs. 
 In contrast, Thomas’s dissent evinces his continuing emphasis on 
the constitutional value of constraint. Quite often, of course, Scalia 
shares Thomas’s value preference on this score, and so—without 
much explanation—we are left to wonder why he chose differently 
here. It may be that Scalia believes that drug abuse and crime pre-
sent an especially invidious threat to American culture and society, 
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and thus we should afford the federal legislature great constitutional 
latitude in its efforts to address these kinds of problems. He has, af-
ter all, abandoned history and text in favor of prudential arguments 
in other important cases involving drug law enforcement.201 And this 
may be a perfectly legitimate constitutional value judgment—just the 
sort of considered decision we trust our judges to make—but without 
any effort to explain or justify his outcome-determinative interpretive 
theory choice, Scalia’s opinion leaves us no grounds on which to eval-
uate or challenge the merits of his judgment on this occasion. This 
(quite typical) kind of omission, I suggest, does our constitutional 
practice a disservice. 
2.   United States v. Comstock
 A second example may help illustrate the complexity and im-
portance of constitutional value judgments in close cases, particularly 
as this second case deals with a very similar interpretive problem—the 
limits of the Necessary and Proper Clause—in the context of a differ-
ent Congressional policy goal. In United States v. Comstock, the 
Court faced a challenge to the Adam Walsh Child Protection and 
Safety Act (CPSA), which permits federal district courts to detain, by 
civil commitment, “sexually dangerous” federal prisoners, even after 
they have finished serving their criminal sentences.202 A similar state 
law had survived multiple Due Process challenges,203 and so it seemed 
that the only remaining question was “whether the Federal Govern-
ment, exercising its enumerated powers, may enact such a statute as 
well.”204 The Court concluded, by a 7-2 vote, that the Necessary and 
Proper Clause gave Congress the requisite constitutional authority.205
 Writing for the majority, Justice Stephen Breyer adopted his cus-
tomary prudential interpretive approach. He argued that five interre-
lated factors supported the congressional authority in question. First, 
though he conceded that the Constitution does not explicitly author-
ize the federal government to “criminalize conduct,” “imprison indi-
viduals,” or “govern[] prisons and prisoners,” he relied heavily on 
McCulloch for the proposition that “Congress nonetheless possesses 
broad authority to do each of those things in the course of ‘carrying 
into Execution’ [its] enumerated powers.”206 Second, the civil com-
mitment statute was only “a modest addition to a longstanding fed-
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eral statutory framework” and thus did not represent a radical de-
parture from standard congressional practice. 207  Third, the civil 
commitment provision was a “reasonable” way for Congress to exer-
cise its custodial duty to protect the public “from the danger federal 
prisoners may pose.”208 Fourth, the statute actively “accommodate[ed]” 
state law enforcement interests, and so it did not “invade state sover-
eignty or otherwise improperly limit the scope of powers that remain 
with the States.”209 Finally, the law’s sufficiently “narrow . . . scope” 
precluded the possibility that it might be the first step towards the 
realization of a “general [federal] police power.”210 Taking all of these 
considerations together, Breyer concluded that the constitutional 
enumeration of federal powers was flexible enough to encompass the 
civil commitment of sexually dangerous persons.211
 Given the latitude and flexibility Justice Scalia had read into the 
Necessary and Proper Clause with his prudential arguments in 
Raich, one might expect that he would have at least concurred with 
the majority in Comstock. But he made a different value judgment 
and theory choice this time, and instead signed on to almost all of 
Justice Thomas’s structural, textual, and historical and dissent.212
Thomas began with the same structural concerns about the limits of 
enumerated federal power that informed his dissent in Raich.213 He 
then found in the text a two-part limitation on the necessary and 
proper power: First, a law must be “necessary” inasmuch as it is “ap-
propriate and plainly adapted to the exercise of an enumerated pow-
er.”214 Second, a law must be “proper” in that it is “not otherwise pro-
hibited by the Constitution and not [in]consistent with its letter and 
spirit.”215 In other words, no matter how well a statute serves a stated 
federal objective, it is unconstitutional if that objective “is anything 
other than ‘carrying into Execution’ one or more of the Federal Gov-
ernment’s enumerated powers.”216
 Thomas then moved to historical argument and located this two-
step principle in the debates over constitutional ratification that oc-
curred in the states between 1787 and 1789.217 He pointed particular-
ly to the responses that Alexander Hamilton and James Madison had 
made to Anti-Federalist claims that the Necessary and Proper Clause 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
 207. Id. at 1961.  
 208. Id.
 209. Id. at 1962 (internal quotations omitted).  
 210. Id. at 1964-65. 
 211. Id. at 1965. 
 212. Id. at 1970 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 213. Id. at 1970-71. 
 214. Id. at 1972 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 
(4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819)). 
 215. Id. (internal quotations omitted) (quoting McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 421). 
 216. Id. (citation omitted). 
 217. Id.
2013]                  CONSTITUTIONAL VALUE JUDGMENTS 295?
would effectively undermine any limits on federal power.218 Both men, 
he argued, understood that the “sweeping clause . . . only extend[s] to 
the enumerated powers.” 219 And he dug up a particularly sympathet-
ic account of the clause that George Nicholas had given during the 
Virginia ratification debates: 
Suppose [the Necessary and Proper Clause] had been inserted, at 
the end of every power, that they should have power to make laws 
to carry that power into execution; would that have increased their 
powers? If, therefore, it could not have increased their powers, if 
placed at the end of each power, it cannot increase them at the end  
of all.220
With this historical understanding in mind, Thomas concluded that 
the Necessary and Proper Clause could not enlarge the legitimate 
subjects of federal authority—if Congress could not locate its legisla-
tive objective squarely within one of its enumerated powers, then the 
necessary and proper power simply had no application.221
 Even Breyer’s majority opinion conceded that no “single specific 
enumerated power” could justify the federal civil commitment  
provision,222  and so Thomas had little trouble concluding that no 
“readily discernable” enumerated power—not even the Commerce 
Clause, the “enumerated power this Court has interpreted most  
expansively”—authorized the CSPA.223 He argued that the principal 
structures of federalism reserve to the states the power to police sex-
ual predators and, moreover, local governments are well-equipped to 
address such problems.224 Indeed, that several states had already en-
acted similar statutes—laws that the CPSA self-consciously mim-
icked—was proof enough that the states well understood their obliga-
tions as the primary source of general police power.225 Thus, just as in 
Raich, Thomas judged that constitutional structure and history 
placed unmistakable constraints on the reach of federal legislative 
authority. Unlike Raich, however, Thomas found a willing cosigner in  
Justice Scalia. 
 Again, the relevant question for purposes of this discussion is why 
Scalia had a change of heart and chose to take a different interpre-
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tive approach to the constitutional question in Comstock—and again, 
we have no explicit justification to work with. The simple answer 
might be that in Raich the necessary and proper power attached di-
rectly to an enumerated power—the Commerce Clause—in a way 
that was not true in Comstock. But this answer is too simple to shed 
any real light on the matter. For if Scalia had chosen history and text
over doctrine and prudence in Raich, he might easily have concluded 
(as Thomas did) that personal marijuana use simply is not ‘com-
merce,’ at which point the Necessary and Proper Clause comes just 
as untethered as it appeared in Comstock. And if he had chosen doc-
trine and prudence over history and text in Comstock, he might easi-
ly have relied on the same (voluminous) precedent that Breyer cited 
in support of Congress’s authority to create and punish federal 
crimes, which would have provided the appropriate predicate for the 
exercise of necessary and proper powers.226 The simple answer, then, 
does no more than beg the question about Scalia’s determinative val-
ue judgments and interpretive theory choices in these cases.  
 The best guess might be that Scalia judged constraint as more im-
portant than flexibility in Comstock, whereas he made the opposite 
judgment in Raich. And again, these may be perfectly sound judg-
ments of the kind we expect from a Supreme Court Justice. Perhaps 
Scalia believed that the national (and international) nature of the 
drug trade presents a problem that requires a flexible federal re-
sponse, while localized state governments are better able to handle 
the dangers posed by individual sexual predators without interfer-
ence from a monolithic federal bureaucracy. Conversely, Breyer 
might have judged that sex crime calls for as flexible and multifacet-
ed a governmental response as the Constitution can afford. The diffi-
culty is that such unexplained and unjustified interpretive theory 
choices obscure these underlying value judgments and so sweep po-
tentially constructive constitutional discussions aside to preserve 
the ideological pretension that constitutional interpretation is as 
“objective” a practice as calling balls and strikes.  
B.   Value Transparency in Constitutional Argument 
 Although many interpretive theory choices go as unexplained as 
those discussed above, judges do, on occasion, make their underlying 
value judgments explicit. In this final Part, I argue that this sort of 
transparency should be standard practice in constitutional argument, 
at least in those close cases of modal conflict where the choice of in-
terpretive theories is likely to determine the final outcome. It may be 
that the general reluctance to discuss underlying value judgments is 
a product of jurisprudential discomfort with the appearance of judi-
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cial policymaking. In truth, however, the judgments at issue, when 
properly made, relate not to social or economic policy but rather to 
constitutional values, and one of the best reasons to make this pro-
cess more transparent is to make it easier to separate the former 
kinds of argument from the latter. It is when decisive underlying 
judgments remain obscure that critics can most credibly read illegit-
imate motivations into a decision. But even more important than 
maintaining appearances, value transparency promises to put the 
real constitutionally normative divergences that divide us more 
squarely in focus. And any argumentative practice that moves us 
closer to the actual sources of dispute is, in my estimation, an im-
portant step forward. 
 In the space that remains, I present an example of a Supreme 
Court opinion that demonstrates exactly the kind of value transparen-
cy I propose. Planned Parenthood v. Casey addressed the most closely 
contested and controversial constitutional issue of our time—elective 
abortion—in a context where the choice of interpretive modality was 
almost certainly outcome-determinative.227 And Casey came at a par-
ticularly acute moment in political time. Just a year and a half into 
his presidency, George H. W. Bush had already taken advantage of the 
opportunity to replace two liberal stalwarts—William Brennan and 
Thurgood Marshall—with Supreme Court Justices of his choosing.228
Many thought that Bush appointees David Souter and Clarence 
Thomas would swing the Court decisively against abortion rights, 
and so just over a year after Thomas took the bench, the nation anx-
iously awaited the decision in Casey. To most observers, it appeared 
that the Court’s two-decade-old decision in Roe v. Wade was in real dan-
ger of repudiation, but when the decision was announced in late June of 
1992, an unprecedented coalition delivered an unlikely opinion.229
 Justices Sandra Day O’Connor, Anthony Kennedy, and David 
Souter authored a joint opinion, and from the opening sentences it 
was evident they would bring their constitutional value judgments to  
the surface: 
Liberty finds no refuge in a jurisprudence of doubt. Yet 19 years 
after our holding that the Constitution protects a woman’s right to 
terminate her pregnancy in its early stages, that definition of lib-
erty is still questioned. Joining the respondents as amicus curiae,
the United States, as it has done in five other cases in the last dec-
ade, again asks us to overrule Roe.230
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Right from the outset, then, the coalition suggested that the Consti-
tution cannot well serve its function in our republic when its mean-
ing is subject to persistent doubt and revisitation. Thus, the Justices 
made no secret of their judgment that the constitutional value of 
negative constraint—which limits the Court’s role as an active consti-
tutional actor—must substantially inform the choice of interpretive 
theories in this case. 
 Doctrinal argument, particularly the kind of doctrinal argument 
that emphasizes the importance of stare decisis, can well serve the 
value of negative constraint. Indeed, as retired Justice Lewis Powell 
observed in a celebrated lecture before the New York Bar Association, 
the principle of stare decisis preserves the Court’s legitimacy by as-
suring the public “that the Court is not composed of unelected judges 
free to write their policy views into law.”231 It was exactly this kind of 
legitimacy-through-constraint that the Casey coalition judged to be of 
paramount importance in addressing an issue like abortion.232 And 
the Justices made clear that it was this underlying value judgment 
that led them to adopt a restrictive doctrinal interpretive approach: 
Our analysis would not be complete . . . without explaining why 
overruling Roe’s central holding would not only reach an unjustifi-
able result under principles of stare decisis, but would seriously 
weaken the Court’s capacity to exercise the judicial power and to 
function as the Supreme Court of a Nation dedicated to the rule of 
law. . . . The Court must take care to speak and act in ways that 
allow people to accept its decisions on the terms the Court claims 
for them, as grounded truly in principle, not as compromises with 
social and political pressures. . . .  
. . . . 
Thus, the Court’s legitimacy depends on making principled deci-
sions under circumstances in which their principled character is 
sufficiently plausible to be accepted by the Nation.233
In this instance, the need for restraint and legitimacy called for applica-
tion of the “neutral principles” that characterize the doctrinal modality.234
 It is of course true, however, that there will often be disputes 
within an interpretive modality about the proper way forward, and 
the coalition frankly acknowledged “the rule of stare decisis is not an 
inexorable command.”235 And so the justices went on to explain the 
principles underlying their judgment that Casey called for a rigid, 
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constrained reading of precedent.236 They suggested four considera-
tions should inform the decision of whether to overturn a weighty 
precedent: (1) whether the previous rule has proved “unworkable”;  
(2) whether significant reliance interests are at stake; (3) whether 
the law has evolved so as to make the precedent a “doctrinal anach-
ronism”; and (4) whether the factual premises underlying the older 
opinion have changed so as render the decision “irrelevant” or “unjus-
tifiable.” 237  None of these considerations, the coalition concluded, 
could in this case justify a departure from Roe’s “essential holding.”238
And it is worth noting here that intramodal disputes, like the doctri-
nal question of when to abandon precedent, can be contested in com-
mensurable terms, with doctrinal terms brought into direct competi-
tion with other doctrinal terms; and that is precisely what the joint 
opinion did in Casey. It created a four-part doctrinal test for overrul-
ing precedent, and in this case, Roe survived. 
 Normally, such an intradoctrinal resolution might be enough to 
close out an opinion, but “the sustained and widespread debate”239
Roe had engendered inspired the justices to reemphasize—a second 
time—their judgment that, in this circumstance, the constitutional 
value of negative constraint counseled the rigid doctrinal approach 
they had taken. The coalition argued there were “two circumstances” 
in which a decision to overturn precedent could dangerously under-
mine the Court’s credibility as a constitutional actor.240 The first is 
when “frequent overruling” or “vacillation” suggests the Court is not 
operating in “good faith”; after all, the justices pointed out “[t]here is 
a limit to the amount of error that can plausibly be imputed to prior 
Courts.”241 The second circumstance arises in contexts such as that 
presented in Casey, where “the Court decides a case in such a way as 
to resolve the sort of intensely divisive controversy reflected in
Roe.”242 In this regard, the justices compared the decision in Roe to 
the similarly divisive issue the Court confronted in Brown v. Board of 
Education.243 In both cases, the Court had called on “the contending 
sides of a national controversy to end their national division by ac-
cepting a common mandate rooted in the Constitution.”244 Such mo-
mentous decisions, the coalition argued, must carry “rare preceden-
tial force,” as the losing side is sure to keep working to undermine 
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the holding—and the Court should not allow itself to become a ma-
nipulable part of the political process.245
 Thus, it is when the political pressures are at their most intense 
that we should place the greatest weight on the value of negative 
constraint. For it is at these times that the Court is most vulnerable 
to the appearance of ideologically motivated activism, and steadfast 
adherence to doctrinal principle is concomitantly most important. In  
such circumstances: 
[O]nly the most convincing justification under accepted standards 
of precedent could suffice to demonstrate that a later decision 
overruling the first was anything but a surrender to political pres-
sure, and an unjustified repudiation of the principle on which the 
Court staked its authority in the first instance. So to overrule un-
der fire in the absence of the most compelling reason to reexamine 
a watershed decision would subvert the Court’s legitimacy beyond 
any serious question. . . .The promise of constancy, once given, 
binds its maker for as long as the power to stand by the decision 
survives and the understanding of the issue has not changed so 
fundamentally as to render the commitment obsolete. From the ob-
ligation of this promise this Court cannot and should not assume 
any exemption when duty requires it to decide a case in conform-
ance with the Constitution. A willing breach of it would be nothing 
less than a breach of faith, and no Court that broke its faith with 
the people could sensibly expect credit for principle in the decision 
by which it did that.246
Lofty rhetoric indeed; but at least it is rhetoric directed to answering 
what are, in my opinion, the most fundamental questions in cases of 
modal conflict: what constitutional values are most important in a 
particular context, and which interpretive theory best serves those 
values? When these underlying judgments are laid bare, as the coali-
tion frankly accomplished in Casey, it allows those who would have 
made a different interpretive theory choice to challenge the decision 
on its stated merits and then to provide their own competing account 
of the constitutional values at stake. 
 Indeed, Chief Justice William Rehnquist mounted just such a 
challenge in his dissent in Casey.247 Perhaps unaccustomed to such a 
candid discussion of value judgments and theory choice, Rehnquist 
admittedly confined his response to a criticism of the coalition’s 
judgment without forwarding much of an alternative account as to 
why a historical, structural, or textual interpretation might be more 
appropriate. Nonetheless, the give and take on these questions is 
something of a welcome anomaly in constitutional argumentative 
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practice. He began his criticism by taking aim at the coalition’s 
judgment about the need for constraint in politically divisive cases: 
This is a truly novel principle, one which is contrary to both the 
Court’s historical practice and to the Court’s traditional willing-
ness to tolerate criticism of its opinions. Under this principle, when 
the Court has ruled on a divisive issue, it is apparently prevented 
from overruling that decision for the sole reason that it was incor-
rect, unless opposition to the original decision has died away.248
Instead of explaining the grounds of his own interpretive theory 
choice, however, Rehnquist devoted the bulk of his discussion to criti-
cizing the coalition’s approach on the prudential grounds that no 
clear criteria separates such “intensely divisive” cases from more typ-
ical precedent.249 Indeed, Rehnquist ultimately made the unfortunate 
claim that in revealing the grounds of its interpretive theory choice, 
the Court had actually undermined its own legitimacy: 
The sum of the joint opinion’s labors in the name of stare decisis
and “legitimacy” is this: Roe v. Wade stands as a sort of judicial Po-
temkin Village, which may be pointed out to passers-by as a mon-
ument to the importance of adhering to precedent. But behind the 
facade, an entirely new method of analysis, without any roots in 
constitutional law, is imported to decide the constitutionality of 
state laws regulating abortion. Neither stare decisis nor “legitimacy” 
are truly served by such an effort.250
 Of course, I entirely disagree with the Chief Justice’s suggestion 
that the joint opinion’s interpretive transparency threatens the 
Court’s legitimacy. Rehnquist’s pretensions notwithstanding, it is not 
as though omitting all discussion of the (necessarily) “novel” value 
judgments that inform interpretive theory choices in difficult cases 
will convince any reasonable observer that those judgments do not 
actually occur. Better, I suggest, to be forthright and candid and, in 
so doing, allow practitioners the opportunity to evaluate the underly-
ing judgments and choices as they are presented and justified. After 
all, it is not the Casey coalition’s policy judgments about abortion 
that are on display,251 but rather its value judgment about the consti-
tutional importance of judicial restraint in politically divisive cases. 
This latter kind of judgment is of exactly the sort we expect constitu-
tional judges to make, and no credibility is lost by offering the public 
a reasoned explanation.  
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 Even if Rehnquist’s response to the Court’s theory justification in 
Casey ultimately falls a little flat, that he was able to challenge the 
coalition’s theory choice justifications on their express terms makes 
the decision an excellent example of the kind of value transparency I 
propose. Indeed, Justice Scalia took up Rehnquist’s flag—with per-
haps a little more success—a decade later with his dissent in Law-
rence v. Texas.252 Just as the competent scientist must justify his 
choice between incommensurable scientific paradigms in terms of the 
shared sorts of criteria Thomas Kuhn described, the competent con-
stitutional practitioner should be prepared to justify her interpretive 
theory choices in terms of our shared constitutional values. Bringing 
this discussion to the forefront, as the Court does in Casey, can only 
make our arguments clearer, more rational, and more closely focused 
on the real sources of constitutional dispute. 
V. CONCLUSION
 Philip Bobbitt has done constitutional law an immense service 
with his practice-based account of the interpretive “modalities” at 
work in constitutional argument. By tying the “legitimacy” of a par-
ticular constitutional assertion to its form—that is, to its consonance 
with the accepted grammar of constitutional practice—Bobbitt frees 
us from the regressions and circularity that persist in attempts to 
justify a “correct” interpretive methodology by reference to some ex-
ternal foundation of constitutional “truth.” Law, for Bobbitt, is a 
practice—an activity—not an artifact. To understand the law is thus 
to know how to practice it, and so to understand the Constitution is 
to be able to make legitimate assertions about its meanings within 
the existing grammatical forms. The academic’s role, then, is to de-
scribe that practice rather than try to justify or discredit it in terms 
of some external normative theory. Just as the Wittgensteinian phi-
losopher’s task is to reveal the misuses of language that create philo-
sophical puzzles—to thus “shew the fly the way out of the fly-
bottle”253—the constitutional theorist’s job is to better understand 
and explain the grammar of constitutional practice as it exists.
 The descriptive explanation Bobbitt offers recounts the six modali-
ties of argument outlined above. For Bobbitt, these modalities are 
roughly analogous to Wittgensteinian language games in that the 
“meaning” of a term derives from its proper use within a particular 
argumentative modality. Thus, like different language games, differ-
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ent argumentative modalities are incommensurable: a term’s mean-
ing within one modality may not be fully translatable into the terms 
used in another modality. As a consequence, there is simply no way 
to fully justify one type of constitutional assertion—say a “doctrinal” 
assertion—in terms of another modality; and thus a conflict between 
two or more modalities cannot be resolved in a practically justifiable 
way. This lack of a “trans-modal” algorithm has bothered many theo-
reticians (and perhaps limited Bobbitt’s own influence) because 
scholars and advocates tend to want to speak normatively and gener-
ally try to provide “right” answers. I agree with Bobbitt that no such 
algorithm exists, but I hope that—in drawing attention to Thomas 
Kuhn’s account of value judgments and theory choices—this Article 
has shed some new light on the processes by which we choose between 
incommensurable interpretive approaches in close and difficult cases. 
 Kuhn, like Wittgenstein in language and Bobbitt in law, under-
stood that competing scientific paradigms are ultimately incommen-
surable. The very terms used in one paradigm refer to a different 
network of concepts in another, and so the decision to adopt a new 
paradigm in terms that exist in an older one cannot be justified. 
Kuhn’s critics responded with fears that his account undermined the 
basic “rationality” of science: If a scientist must choose to adopt a 
new paradigm before she has the conceptual apparatus necessary to 
justify that choice, it appears the choice itself cannot arise from the 
application of neutral or “objective” principles. There is, in other 
words, no algorithmic way to claim that a paradigm choice is ulti-
mately “right” or “wrong”—and science appears ultimately to be a 
subjective kind of pursuit. Kuhn pushed back, however, and argued 
objective choice “criteria” do inform—if not determine—scientific the-
ory choices. These criteria are objective in that they are broadly 
shared and form something like a “shared canon” that scientists must 
refer to in justifying their theory choices. The lack of a universal 
choice algorithm means only that some element of the final decision 
remains personal and subjective. Thus, for Kuhn, the emphasis given a 
particular criterion in a particular context is open to individual value 
judgment, and importantly, it is incumbent on the individual scientist 
to explain this judgment when justifying her final theory choice. 
 I suggest that Kuhn’s account has important lessons for the prac-
tice of constitutional law. It is a useful way to conceive of the choices 
that constitutional practitioners must make between incommensura-
ble interpretive modalities in cases where this theory choice is likely 
outcome-determinative. To facilitate this kind of approach, I derive 
an incomplete and—admittedly—somewhat idiosyncratic list of “con-
stitutional values” from the constitutional canon. I refer to the canon 
because it is critically important that the values I identify are broad-
ly shared, as this is what allows them to be the “objective” elements 
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at work in our interpretive theory choices. The four overlapping and 
competing values I identify are constraint, flexibility, representation,
and identity. I suggest these are among the important purposes or 
functions we believe the Constitution serves in our democratic sys-
tem, and that they should inform our interpretive theory choices in 
close and difficult cases.  
 I then examine the ways particular constitutional value judg-
ments may have influenced particular interpretive theory judgments 
in two concrete cases. I conclude that like the competent scientist, the 
competent constitutional practitioner should forthrightly acknowledge 
and justify the constitutional value judgments that led her to choose 
an interpretive theory in a given case, and I offer the joint opinion in 
Planned Parenthood v. Casey as an example of an argument so con-
structed. Such explanations move us closer to the real sources of our 
constitutional disagreements by shifting focus towards the underly-
ing judgments that we all make about the purposes the Constitution 
serves in our legal practice. It is then in terms of these purposes that 
we should make and justify our interpretive theory choices, most par-
ticularly when those choices seem likely to determine the outcome of 
an important case. 
 Ultimately, of course, revealing and assessing the value judg-
ments that influence interpretive theory choices is unlikely to reduce 
either the number or the intensity of our constitutional disputes. In-
deed, as Bobbitt persuasively argues, it is only through these dis-
putes—through actual constitutional argument—that we legitimate 
constitutional assertions and the institution of judicial review itself. 
A practice of value transparency promises, however, to move our ar-
guments closer to the questions that really should concern us in con-
stitutional law. How does constitutional practice work? What purpos-
es does the Constitution itself serve in that practice? How do we 
make interpretive theory choices that reinforce—rather than under-
mine—those purposes? Understanding and justifying the judgments 
we make on these questions in particular cases can only strengthen 
our practice and clarify its nature. And after all it is clarity, not truth, 
that helps the fly to find his way out of the bottle—and it is clarity—not 
truth—that the constitutional theorist can offer constitutional practice. 
